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5.1  Introduction
At a crucial juncture in the B-Deduction, Kant makes an important 
distinction. He writes:
To think an object and to know [erkennen] an object are thus not the 
same. For two components belong to knowledge [zum Erkenntnisse]: first, 
the concept, through which an object is thought at all (the category),1 
and second, the intuition, through which it is given; for if an intuition 
corresponding to the concept could not be given at all, then it would be a 
thought as far as its form is concerned, but without any object, and by its 
means no knowledge of anything at all [keine Erkenntnis von irgendeinem 
Dinge] would be possible, since, as far as I would know [wüßte], noth-
ing would be given nor could be given to which my thought could be 
applied. (B146; trans. emended)
Here, Kant indicates that there is still important work to be done after 
completing the so-called ‘first step’ of deducing the categories from the 
principle of apperception,2 which concerned the necessary form of con-
ceiving of an object in general, since that deduction is incomplete if it 
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196     5 Problems of Kantian Nonconceptualism …
cannot be shown how the categories apply to objects of  human sensible 
intuition. As Kant writes, “the categories do not afford us  knowledge 
[Erkenntniß ] of things by means of intuition except through their 
 possible application to empirical intuition, i.e., they serve only for the 
possibility of empirical knowledge” (B147; trans. emended). Only by 
showing the manner in which this application comes about will Kant 
have explained fully the possibility of empirical knowledge, which he 
defines as “experience” (B147; cf. B165–6). There has been much dis-
cussion in the Kant literature about the role and structure of the second 
part, the so-called ‘second step’, of the B-Deduction. However, I am not 
going to engage with it here directly (see Chap. 7). In this chapter, I am 
interested more broadly in the extent to which the discussion around 
Kantian nonconceptualism captures an important, structural aspect of 
the general argument in, and goal of, the B-Deduction. Most commen-
tators believe that in the second part of the Transcendental Deduction 
(TD) Kant in fact wants to exclude the possibility that there would be 
intuitions, perceptions or sensory content to which the categories are 
not applied or applicable, thus excluding the possibility of so-called 
‘nonconceptual content’. This is what Kant already appears to suggest 
at B136 and in the conclusion of the ‘first step’ of the B-Deduction, at 
B143, and certainly in the conclusion of the ‘second step’ at B159ff., 
in §26, where Kant appears to assert that simply everything that comes 
before our senses is subsumable under the categories. This last position is 
roughly called ‘conceptualism’.
Conceptualism can be defined as the thesis that (1) any conscious, 
representational content, intuition or appearance is determined by 
our conceptual capacity and that conscious, representational content, 
or an intuition or appearance can only refer to objects if and when it 
is subsumed under concepts, and that (2) non-human (lower animal) 
beings do not possess such conceptual capacities, by means of which 
they perceive, and thus refer to, objects in the strict sense. I shall here 
treat ‘intuition’, ‘appearance’, ‘representational content’ or also ‘sen-
sory content’ as roughly equivalent expressions, although the latter 
two are, generally speaking, broader in meaning than the former, and 
have the infelicitous connotation that the term ‘content’ might sug-












thus putatively excluding the possibility of nonconceptual content. But 
since the term has been in use in the debate on nonconceptual content, 
I shall continue referring to sensory or representational content as sig-
nifying material content that is representationally significant in some 
(subjectively valid) sense, but not necessarily cognitively significant in 
the demanding sense that Kant associates with objective validity, that is, 
being about a definite object. On this definition, the term ‘nonconcep-
tual content’ is thus not an oxymoron.3
Conceptualism can be differentiated into strong and weak concep-
tualism, whereby, if we translate this to the strictly Kantian context, 
strong conceptualism holds that the understanding, i.e. our conceptual 
capacity (A68ff./B93ff.), is not only the determining ground of any 
cognitive judgement, but also of sensibility itself. Weak conceptualism 
means that, whereas the understanding determines all cognitive empiri-
cal judgements, which are based on empirical intuitions, sensibility 
itself is independent of the capacity of the understanding, and not all 
conceptual activity (e.g. demonstrative reference) need take place exclu-
sively in the context of explicit cognitive judgements.4
By contrast, Kantian nonconceptualists want to argue that Kant does 
leave open the possibility of intuitions or perceptions that are not sub-
sumed or even subsumable under the categories.5 Nonconceptualism 
is roughly the thesis that (1) not every conscious, objective representa-
tional content is merely or at all determined by our conceptual capacity, 
and that intuitions immediately and independently of concepts percep-
tually “present” (Allais 2009:384, 386, 389)6 objects or particulars to 
us; that (2) at least some human, objective conscious content occurs 
independently of our conceptual capacity and is not determined by it7; 
and that (3) at least some non-human beings (i.e. animals)8 have an 
awareness of some sort of, and are not merely responding mechanically 
to, their surroundings.9
I want to argue that Kantian nonconceptualists are right insofar as 
the possibility of intuitions that are not subsumed (or subsumable) 
under the categories is concerned, but that they are wrong to claim 
(1) that such intuitions are or can be considered synthesised  content
independently of the understanding or judgement, and (2) that
these intuitions are objectively valid cognitions or refer to objects.
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Some Kantian nonconceptualists argue that nonconceptual content 
is still synthesised content in the sense that it is synthesised by means 
of figurative synthesis, which Kant distinguishes from intellectual 
 synthesis, which nonconceptualists identify as uniquely characteristic 
of conceptual content. I argue that, although formally distinguishable, 
figurative synthesis (a.k.a. the productive imagination) is not possible 
without intellectual synthesis.
In Sect. 5.2, I discuss the conceptualist position of John McDowell, 
against which Lucy Allais argues and defends a nonconceptualist read-
ing of Kant; her position is discussed in Sect. 5.4. But before that, in 
Sect. 5.3, I first discuss the nonconceptualist position of Robert Hanna. 
Both Allais and Hanna spearheaded the discussion of Kantian non-
conceptualism in the mid- to late noughties. I therefore focus on their 
interpretations.10 In Sect. 5.5, I address some conceptualist interpre-
tations of a crucial passage in the run-up to TD, at A89–90/B122–3, 
which is the best evidence for a nonconceptualist interpretation of 
Kant. Against these interpretations, both conceptualist and nonconcep-
tualist, I make a case for a moderately conceptualist reading of Kant, 
which leaves room for nonconceptual mental content in some mini-
mal sense (Sect. 5.6); my reading is different from the aforementioned 
weak conceptualism in the way that I stress the modally moderate sense 
in which concept and intuition are related. Additional problems for the 
nonconceptualist readings of TD are flagged in due course.
5.2  McDowell on the Relation Between 
Concept and Intuition
McDowell (1996, 2009a) presents a view of the relation of concepts to 
sensory content, to which concepts must in some epistemically relevant 
way be answerable, that is in an important sense close to Kant’s view. 
Very globally put, the central problem that he is interested in concerns 
the foundation of empirical knowledge, or indeed, in more Kantian 
terms, the possibility of such knowledge. In McDowell’s view, Kant’s 











without concepts are blind” (A51/B75) hint at the solution to the prob-
lem. As Kant asserts, only in the connection of thoughts and intuitions 
is knowledge possible. This in itself does not give us much in terms of a 
solution to the problem of the possibility of knowledge. In some sense, 
we must be able to indicate what makes the connection work and to 
what extent thoughts and intuitions are effectively connected such that 
knowledge ensues or is made possible. The unifying element which con-
nects two distinguishable and irreducible items or “two stems of human 
knowledge, namely, sensibility and understanding” (B29) into a unity 
concerns what Kant calls synthesis, or as McDowell (2009a:30–33) puts 
it, “togetherness”. I shall say more about this below.11
At B151–2, Kant speaks of a connection or combination of repre-
sentations that is non-intellectual—precisely what McDowell believes 
is necessary for having empirically contentual thoughts, that is, knowl-
edge that amounts to more than empty thoughts that, to put it in 
McDowell’s terms, “spin in a void”, in contrast to concepts that are 
answerable to the world. Kant calls this non-intellectual connection fig-
urative synthesis (synthesis speciosa) or also the transcendental synthesis 
of the imagination. This power of the imagination belongs to sensibility 
and combines the sensible representational material in an intuition into 
a unity. However, because according to Kant every synthesis is an act 
of spontaneity, an act of determination (cf. B129–30),12 and is not, as 
with sensibility, that which is determinable or being determined, tran-
scendental synthesis of the imagination is an a priori power that is the 
effect of the understanding itself on sensibility. After having differenti-
ated figurative from intellectual synthesis in the preceding section, Kant 
writes:
Imagination is the faculty of representing in intuition an object that is 
not itself present. Now since all our intuition is sensible, the imagination, 
owing to the subjective condition under which alone it can give to the 
concepts of understanding a corresponding intuition, belongs to sensibil-
ity. But inasmuch as its synthesis is an expression of spontaneity, which is 
determinative and not, like sense, determinable merely [bloß bestimmbar], 
and which is therefore able to determine sense a priori in respect of its 
form in accordance with the unity of apperception, imagination is to that 
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extent a faculty which determines the sensibility a priori; and its synthe-
sis of intuitions, conforming as it does to the categories [den Kategorien 
gemäß ] must be the transcendental synthesis of the imagination. This 
synthesis is an action [Wirkung] of the understanding on the sensibility; 
and is the first application [of the understanding] to the objects of our 
 possible intuition. (B151–2; trans. Kemp Smith)
This passage is of central importance for answering the question 
regarding the relation between sensibility and the understanding, 
between intuition and concept. I believe that Hegel already saw clearly 
the relevance of Kant’s discussion of the productive imagination for 
addressing the issue concerning the relation between concept and sen-
sible content. In his early, formative essay Faith and Knowledge, which 
contains one of his earliest and most sustained expositions of Kant’s 
theoretical philosophy, Hegel points out that with the notion of the 
productive imagination Kant shows the way in transcending the epis-
temological dead ends of what Hegel calls “reflective philosophy”, 
which puts up barriers in terms of absolute distinctions between the 
elements of cognition, of which he accuses Kant too. Hegel interprets 
Kant’s notion of the productive imagination as the power of reason 
itself, of which the understanding and sensibility are mere derivative 
forms. In Hegel’s view, it is the productive imagination which forms 
the original-synthetic unity, from which the discursive understanding 
and sensibility first spring as differentiable elements. In this way, the 
productive imagination is to be seen as the ground of both sensibility 
and the understanding (GuW, 4:327): sensibility and the understand-
ing can first be differentiated, because they are different modifications 
of the same productive imagination. Productive imagination is what 
primordially unites concepts and sensory content, which thus solves 
the problem regarding the foundation of knowledge in sensibility, of 
how the understanding comes to determine sensible content. For pro-
ductive imagination is the synthetic a priori, rational principle which 
is operative in “extension” itself, as Hegel writes (GuW, 4:329, 341), 
in other words, it is operative in sensibility or intuition itself—it is the 
very principle of sensibility, as Hegel says (GuW, 4:327). (Hegel’s cri-












One can detect a similar Hegelian inspired reading of productive 
imagination as the combinatory factor between concept and intuition, 
the ‘togetherness’ of conceptuality and sensible content, in McDowell, 
who argues that conceptuality is already, in some sense, operative in sen-
sibility. Let me expand. Following Wilfrid Sellars, McDowell believes 
that “judging is not the only mode of actualization of conceptual 
capacities” (2009a:5). McDowell takes “judging” to be an act by virtue 
of our freedom, something for whose content we take responsibility, 
and for which we are held responsible and must give reasons if asked 
(cf. Chap. 3, this volume). If we make a claim to knowledge, that is, 
if there is a “knowing”, then we place that which we claim to know in 
the “logical space of reasons” in contrast to a merely sensible percep-
tion, or, being sensibly affected by an object, which as natural fact we 
place in the logical “space of nature” (McDowell 2009a:4–5).13 Judging 
as such a “knowing” is a typical epistemic fact which must be placed in 
the space of reasons. In his earlier book (McDowell 1996), McDowell 
outlined the explanatory problem with which the two classical episte-
mological theories, foundationalism and coherentism, are faced when 
trying to explain the justificatory basis of knowledge claims. What is 
interesting in this context is that in order to get out of this epistemo-
logical cul-de-sac McDowell appeals to Kant’s above-quoted adage that 
thoughts without intuition are empty and intuition without concepts 
blind. To guarantee a critical naturalism or empiricism which is not a 
reductive physicalism, our conceptuality, and hence our claim to true 
knowledge, must somehow eventually be grounded in what Sellars 
(1997:68–73) calls “observation reports”, and these, in turn, in sensi-
ble intuition or perception. Sensible perception must provide the justi-
ficatory ground of our knowledge claims, albeit that such “observation 
reports” themselves in turn necessarily rest on a perspective on the world 
(McDowell 2009a:6–7).
What McDowell picks up from Kant, partly following Sellars, is the 
belief that the manner in which our knowledge claims are grounded in 
sensibility, in such “observation reports”, is not one of being grounded in 
a purely given sensory content,14 such as sense data or factual objects in 
the world. The crucial point is that whatever necessary sensible content 
must be presupposed for knowledge, it will not as merely ‘given’ provide 
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the justificatory ground of knowledge. In the above-quoted passage at 
B151, Kant makes clear that the productive imagination, which bridges 
the gap between concept and intuition and so presumably provides the 
justificatory ground of knowledge, is not sensibility itself, which must be 
determined; rather, it is the determinative or determining element that 
provides this ground, since it is an “exercise of spontaneity” (Ausübung 
der Spontaneität) that alone can provide justifications for our beliefs.15 
Despite this, the productive imagination belongs to sensibility, which 
makes it properly answerable to the world of sensible objects.
Herein, McDowell sees the solution to the problem concerning the 
correspondence between concept and intuition, between judgement 
and perception. Perception itself, by virtue of this spontaneity in sen-
sibility, provides us with the justificatory basis of knowledge, which is, 
however, only first explicitly articulated conceptually in judgements. The 
sensible episodes of a perceptual experience “contain” already “a claim”, 
as McDowell (2009a:10–12)16 contends following Sellars. A percep-
tual experience is not merely an observation report, but is itself already 
intentionally directed towards the world. Perceptual experiences are not 
merely episodes of sensible content or even consciousness or awareness 
but already “actualizations of conceptual capacities” (2009a:10), if not 
yet fully-fledged judgements. In this way, however, the Kantian distinc-
tion between concept and intuition is not sublated, for—as McDowell 
(2009a:11) makes it clear—it being the case that we judge that things 
are as they appear to us in the way that they are, the fact that they 
appear to us in a certain way is not the same as judging that they so 
appear. The epistemic fact of judging is not reducible to the natural 
fact of the sensory affection, nor is the latter reducible to the former. 
Formally, concept and intuition, or, judgings and percepts, are separa-
ble. But in an actual episode of perceptual experience they are always 
already inextricably connected. In McDowell’s view, the intuition of an 
empirically given object is already a proto-judgement, which pre-forms, 
as it were, the objective predicative locution proper in an actual judge-
ment that has the predicative form S is P.
Also apparently important here is heeding the distinction between 
a singular representation or sensation and a self-standing  intuition, 












(see B41; B47; A19/B33; B377). Presumably, an intuition is by defini-
tion always already a perceptual experience of an object or a particular, 
not just an aggregate of representations (I believe that the distinction 
is not as clear-cut as some would make it out to be, for in Kant’s view 
sensations are just the empirical content of any empirical intuition, 
which connects it to objects; see A19–20/B34). As a demonstrative ‘this 
here’, such an experience is already conceptual. This narrow definition 
of intuition, as separable from sensations, plays a significant role in the 
debate surrounding nonconceptual content (I shall return to this aspect 
further below). According to both McDowell and Sellars, intuitions are 
thus already conceptual, in some sense. In contrast to McDowell, Sellars 
(1992:8) wants to retain though the idea of “sheer receptivity”, namely 
the purely being receptive to impressions or impingements of the exter-
nal world which as such are not conceptual. McDowell (2009a:16) sees 
no epistemically explanatory or transcendental role for “sheer recep-
tivity”. At first blush, it is indeed difficult to see what transcendental 
function “sheer receptivity” can fulfil for the explanation of epistemi-
cally relevant perception,17 in addition to acknowledging, as we saw 
McDowell do, that the fact that things appear to us (are “received” by 
us) is not the same as judging that they so appear.
For McDowell, the inseparability of concept and intuition is impor-
tant for understanding the way in which we orient ourselves in the 
world, are directed towards the world, as well as the manner in which 
the world is as it were preformed for our actual judgements about the 
world. McDowell insists, time and again, on the fact that knowledge 
is grounded in the connection between concept and intuition and 
that without this connection no knowledge is possible. This reveals 
his Kantian credentials. McDowell (2009a) demonstrates how Kant’s 
Leitfaden in the Metaphysical Deduction (MD) provides the key to the 
solution to the question of the justificatory ground of our knowledge 
claims. Kant writes:
The same function that gives unity to the different representations in a 
judgment also gives unity to the mere synthesis of different representations 
in an intuition, which, expressed generally, is called the pure concept of 
the understanding. The same understanding, therefore, and indeed by 
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means of the very same actions through which it brings the logical form 
of a judgment into concepts by means of the analytical unity, also brings 
a transcendental content into its representations by means of the syn-
thetic unity of the manifold in intuition in general, on account of which 
they are called pure concepts of the understanding that pertain to objects 
a priori […]. (A79/B104–5)
The Leitfaden indicates—and let me put this in the slightly misleading 
terms McDowell (2009a:33–35) uses—that the “togetherness” of items 
in judgements and between inferentially linked series of judgements, 
that is, a conceptual or logical “togetherness”, is also actualised on the 
level of sensibility. McDowell’s (2009a:29ff.) understanding of the 
Leitfaden shows that he has in any case understood well that the same 
conceptual operationalisation—Kant speaks of “the same function”—is 
active on two formally distinguishable levels, on the sensory as well as 
the conceptual level, within an actual empirical judgement.18 The role 
that perceptual experience plays is not a question of the putative given-
ness of sense data or some blind intuition on which judgement only 
post hoc imposes its conceptual structure. On the other hand, accord-
ing to McDowell perceptual experience is also not an act of free agency, 
as is the case in judgement proper. It is formally distinguishable from a 
judgement and at the same time it contributes to knowledge inseparably 
from judgement.
This last point concerning the distinguishability of a perceptual expe-
rience appears to contradict Kant’s own idea of productive imagination 
as an act of spontaneity, because for Kant any conceptual operationali-
sation can only be a spontaneous act of the understanding. McDowell 
exploits Kant’s distinction between receptivity and spontaneity with-
out granting an epistemic role to Sellars’s “sheer receptivity”. According 
to McDowell, a perceptual experience, which is a conceptual episode 
and not merely a sense impression or a mental state that is prompted 
by a sense impression, already “contains a claim”, whose content pre-
cisely corresponds to the content of a judgement. The difference, how-
ever, between perceptual experience and an actual judgement lies in 
the fact that the “actualization of conceptual capacities” in a perceptual 











why McDowell wishes to talk about “actualization” and not about an 
“exercise” of “conceptual capacities” in sensibility (see e.g. McDowell 
1996:10).19 Free exercise, as spontaneity, is in McDowell’s view 
restricted to an actual judging, which is eo ipso predicative in nature, 
and not merely a perceptual experience. Conversely, a perceptual experi-
ence is not predicative.
This is an ingenious way of reading Kant’s account of the concept-
intuition relation. However, it is problematic both systematically and 
interpretatively. McDowell regards the act of judgement very much 
as an effective control one has over “one’s cognitive life” (2009a:11), 
in contrast to perception, in which logically there is an at least partly 
involuntary reaction to an external object which affects me from the 
outside and over which I thus have no control. McDowell (2009a:12) 
refers to an enunciation of Sellars’s, who expresses the conceptual in a 
perceptual experience in terms of a “claim [which] is, so to speak, evoked 
or wrung from the perceiver by the object perceived” (Sellars 1997:40; 
emphasis added). In contrast to “knowings”, “seeings”—i.e. “epistemic 
seeings” in Dretke’s sense20—contain claims and thus are conceptual 
episodes in such a way that these claims are “necessitated ” (McDowell 
2009a:12) by the object of perception. Sellars appears to exploit the 
English term ‘impression’ by pointing out that that which a perceptual 
experience contains in terms of a claim is ‘impressed’, as it were, upon 
the subject of perception.
In the context of McDowell’s as well as Sellars’s qualified empiricism, 
it is understandable that a strict distinction is maintained between pas-
sive sensibility and the judging subject, who actively ‘directs herself ’ 
intentionally to the object of perception. At the same time, McDowell 
wants to stress the fact that there is already, inchoately, a sense of inten-
tionality present in perceptual experience itself. A perceptual experience, 
as sensible awareness, is itself already intentionally directed at the world, 
as McDowell argues. Significantly, McDowell says that the German 
Anschauung would be best translated as “a having in view” (2009a:260), 
rather than as ‘intuition’. The key question is how the actualisation of 
conceptual capacities in perceptual experience is effectively achieved if it 
does not occur by means of an exercise of spontaneity, that is, an act 
of the understanding. There is nothing conceptual about sensible states 
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as such—something that is underscored by Sellars’s distinction between, 
on the one hand, “sheer receptivity”, the de facto receiving of sensations, 
and perceptual experience, on the other. For McDowell, however, it can-
not be the case that a perceptual episode is not in principle an item for 
judgement (2009a:19, 21n.32, 264). This makes McDowell’s position 
quintessentially conceptualist. That is, for McDowell perceptual episodes 
are conceptually laden or permeated and have always already intentional-
ity, even if independently of an effective act of the understanding (that 
is, independently of an actual judgement). They always already have the 
world in view, even though it is true to say that sensations qua sensations 
have that intentionality only “vestigially” (McDowell 2009a:121). The 
unity that is realised by the productive imagination is not “an amalgam, 
however intimately bound together, of components that belong severally 
to sensibility and understanding” (McDowell 2009a:124); on the con-
trary, as Hegel emphasised (GuW, 4:329), it is a unity which already lies 
in perceptual experience, it is as it were ‘immersed’ in sensibility itself. 
Hence, the directedness to the world must also already be contained in 
sensibility itself, by virtue of the productive imagination’s “actualization 
of conceptual capacities” in intuition. As McDowell observes, “the unity 
of intuitions is not prior to and independent of the unifying capacities of 
the understanding” (2009a:101).
But where does that leave the activity of the apperceiving subject who 
is conscious of her manifold sensations as her own and is a fortiori con-
scious of the unity which she herself puts into the manifold in intuition 
that she regards as her own? What is the role of self-consciousness in 
the actualisation of conceptual capacities in intuition? McDowell con-
siders his reading of the relation between conceptuality and intuitions 
as authentically Kantian. It is unclear, however, how McDowell visual-
ises the effective “actualization of conceptual capacities” in sensibility 
if it is not achieved by means of the understanding; furthermore, such 
a view of productive imagination contradicts Kant’s view that produc-
tive imagination is an “exercise of spontaneity” by the understanding, a 
legislative power or activity, and precisely not an “involuntary” neces-
sitation by the external object that affects me. As I argued in Chap. 3, 
Kant’s conception of spontaneity in the context of making judgements 












that is necessarily linked to receptivity of sense impressions; hence, it 
is a relative spontaneity, unlike the absolute spontaneity of our moral 
will. However, it is nonetheless the spontaneity of the understanding, by 
way of the imagination, which alone conceptually determines intuitions 
given in sensibility; receptivity only plays the role of providing sense 
impressions.
There is nothing involuntary about the imagination’s conceptual 
capacity in sensibility that determines our apprehension of impressions 
of objects. As Robert Pippin, reflecting on Sellars’s views, rightly notes, 
it is not the case that “some sort of mental activity is merely triggered 
into operation, or let us say, occurs non-apperceptively”, in other words, 
“the ‘evoking’ by a red object in sunlight of ‘this is red’ from a person 
who knows the language to which this sentence belongs is ‘no mere con-
ditioned response’” (2013:381–382). McDowell would probably agree 
on this last point, because we have seen him argue that in sensibility 
there is an actualisation of conceptual capacities that is not due to just 
the mere reception of impressions, but it is unclear to me what role, if 
any, McDowell accords the apperceptive spontaneous subject in such 
actualisation. What for Kant is clearly an act by the apperceptive subject, 
McDowell wants to prise apart from any active role on the subject’s part.
It is thus not surprising that McDowell talks about “togetherness” 
instead of “synthesis”, a term he anxiously avoids, as it might imply the 
activity of synthesising. “Togetherness”, by contrast, conveniently lacks 
the connotation of activity. McDowell even asserts, when he does mention 
synthesis, that “[m]ere synthesis just happens, it is not our doing, unlike 
making judgments, deciding what to think about something” (2009a:35). 
Synthesis is however not something that just happens. According to Kant, 
at least in the B-Deduction,21 the productive imagination or figurative 
synthesis is “an action [Wirkung] of the understanding on the sensibility” 
(B152; trans. Kemp Smith22), and synthesis is always “an act of [the sub-
ject’s] self-activity” (B130). The synthesis of the imagination is not a syn-
thesis that is distinct from the synthesis of the understanding, but is rather 
the effect of the synthesis of the understanding in sensibility itself; it is in 
sensibility that the understanding’s synthesis manifests itself as the synthe-
sis of the productive imagination, as a figurative rather than a merely intel-
lectual synthesis (cf. again B151–2) (see further Chap. 7).












208     5 Problems of Kantian Nonconceptualism …
The unity that lies in perceptual experience is the unity that is put 
into the sensory content by an active subject, who is conscious of 
her act of judgement.23 The knowledge which the perceptual expe-
rience yields is not knowledge that merely results from the “together-
ness” of sensibility and understanding that is subsequently expressed 
propositionally in a judgement. Such “togetherness” would always be a 
merely contingent connection and not the necessary connection that is 
required for knowledge, and, importantly, must be recognised as such 
by the agent of judgement. An act of recognition must lie at the foun-
dation of a necessary connection (cf. B130; Chap. 6, this volume); how-
ever, such an act is not, as McDowell believes, a mere control over one’s 
cognitive life. What Kant means by a synthesis which is active on the 
level of sensibility itself is the subject’s own act of consciously taking 
responsibility for her conscious life, for all of her sensations and per-
ceptual experiences as her own. Of course, McDowell (2009a:72n.8) 
is right that it cannot be the case that the subject is continuously self-
reflective or inspecting herself. However, by construing ‘activity’ too 
reflectively (2009a:71) or indeed psychologically, as if some ‘muttering 
to oneself ’ were at issue (which is not at all what Kantian subjectivity is 
about), McDowell underestimates the fact that for Kant the justificatory 
ground of our knowledge claims lies, not in sensibility itself, no matter 
how conceptually loaded, but in the apperceiving act of the understand-
ing, in the act of judgement, alone (cf. A106–7) (see again Chap. 3).24
I believe that McDowell is thus wrong in claiming that “[n]ot all 
instances of that kind of unity [he means the ‘togetherness’ which lies in 
perceptual experience] need to be seen as resulting from free cognitive 
activity” (2009a:72). It may be obvious that certain kinds of connec-
tion—e.g. purely subjective associations of representations, or indeed 
the contingent arrays in which an arbitrary series of representations are 
prompted in the mind and isomorphically correspond to physiological 
sensations in the brain, which in their turn are physiologically linked 
up with the body—are not strictly speaking the product of spontane-
ous cognitive activity in the sense of Kantian apperception or a priori 
synthesis. A Kantian argument can be formulated to the effect that such 
contingent connections are in fact not due to the spontaneous activ-












as to the fact that the combination at issue, combination in the strict 
sense of a priori synthesis, “can never come to us through the senses, 
and therefore cannot already be contained in the pure form of sensible intui-
tion” (B129; emphasis added). This is so, “for it is an act of the spon-
taneity of the power of representation” and “all combination […] is an 
action of the understanding”, which “we would designate with the gen-
eral title ‘synthesis’” (B129–30).25 Kant means a specific, a priori, neces-
sary and hence a priori intelligible necessary connection and not just any 
causal connection that just results from being contingently, a posteriori 
affected by or being impressed with sensory content (on these issues see 
again Chap. 3). In contrast to McDowell, Kant thus stresses that it is 
the subject who a priori puts the combination into the object, and so 
into the manifold of intuition. The combination or “togetherness” is 
therefore a result of the activity of the cognising subject, not something 
that is encountered as already contained in the sensible manifold, in any 
mere perceptual episode.
In a later essay (McDowell 2009b:264–265), however, McDowell 
abandons the language of “togetherness” and advances a somewhat dif-
ferent reading of the relation between the unity of intuition and the 
unity of judgement, which there he regards as more intimate. With 
 reference to the Leitfaden passage, he asserts that both the unity of intu-
ition and the unity of judgements are grounded in “an operation of the 
same unifying function”, just as Kant says. The unity of intuition might 
be said even to be due to the power to judge, but McDowell is adamant 
that it still not be seen as a conscious discursive activity, in the way that 
connecting concepts in a judgement is—even though he stresses that 
it is neither a “pre-discursive” activity. To put the point differently, in 
McDowell’s own words, “even though the unity-providing function is 
a faculty for discursive activity, it is not in discursive activity that these 
[conceptual] capacities are operative in intuitions” (2009b:265; empha-
sis added). So while McDowell is more aware of the one single ground 
of both unities, he still prises the activity in intuition apart from the 
discursive activity of explicit conceptual utterances. As with the earlier 
expounded views of McDowell, this reading is faced with the difficulty 
of how to account for the way in which the “actualisations of concep-
tual capacities” in intuitions effectively do become explicitly propositional 
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content in judgements, and so fails to explain Kant’s central question 
about the possibility of knowledge, which for Kant is allied to the ques-
tion of synthetic a priori judgements.26
This problem is exemplified by McDowell’s emphasising that the con-
ceptual content of an intuition is “in the intuition in a form in which 
one could make it, that very content, figure in discursive activity”—he 
speaks of a “potential for discursive activity” (2009b:265). In this way, 
McDowell introduces a modal element, which makes it difficult to 
understand what makes the unity of intuition subsequently become an 
actual judgement if it is the same function, by means of the same actions, 
that operates both in intuition and at the level of judgement.27 On 
McDowell’s reading, it appears that either there are—despite his insist-
ence to the contrary—in effect two functions, which operate separately 
at distinct stages of the cognitive process—in perceptual experiences 
and in judgings, or there is indeed one function, but which operates 
in separable contexts and under different conditions, namely, either 
as non-discursive activity in an intuition or as discursive activity in an 
actual judgement—which begs the question as to what binds the two 
functions or, if there is still one function, its distinct operations or activ-
ities, in cases where there is in fact a genuine judgement about a per-
ceived object, which “redeploys some of the content of the intuition” 
(2009b:266), to use McDowell’s phrase. McDowell (2009b:270) talks 
about a potentiality of the intuitional content being actualised in a dis-
cursive “tak[ing] to be so”; but it is unclear how McDowell envisages by 
what means the potential is actualised or realised. The modal talk about 
the potential for conceptual content (in intuition) becoming actual-
ised stands in tension with the claim that the unity of intuition and the 
unity of judgement are due to the same conceptual capacities, even to 
the same capacity to judge; if the same function is the ground, both of 
the potential conceptual content of an intuition and of the actual con-
ceptual content of a discursive judgement, then the actualisation of the 
potential in an intuition cannot rest on that same function, but requires 
another, additional function.28
But of course, for Kant, the “same function” of synthesis is precisely 
intended to be the single original function that already binds con-











is no further, even more fundamental function, by means of which 
the content of intuition “could […] figure in [the] discursive activity” 
(McDowell 2009b:265) of a judgement. It seems that McDowell misap-
prehends the a priori nature of the synthesis of concept and intuition 
that is at issue in TD. If a priori synthesis is supposed to ground the rela-
tion between intuition and concept at the fundamental level, then there 
is no more original function, by virtue of which the content of intuition 
can, in a (possible) subsequent stage of cognition, become, or “enable” 
(McDowell 2009b:266), the content of explicitly discursive activity. The 
intuitional content either is or is not the content of such discursive activ-
ity, as that activity is operative in judgement. Intuition does not enable a 
judgement, it is the content of a judgement, or it is not.
McDowell acknowledges that “much of the content of an ordinary 
visual intuition, the capacities that are in play in one’s having it as part 
of the content of one’s intuition are not even susceptible of discursive 
exercise”—he mentions the “finely discriminable shapes and shades of 
colour that visual experience presents to one” (2009b:265; emphasis 
added). Such content is clearly not content that figures in judgements. 
But this stands in tension with his other claim that “an intuition’s con-
tent is all conceptual”, in the sense that it has the disposition to be 
made to “figure in discursive activity” (McDowell 2009b:265), that is, 
in judgements. Such a view begs the question against the (essential) 
nonconceptualist, who denies that intuitional content is conceptual, 
let alone must figure in judgements (although it could)—a position we 
shall consider in the following sections.
Concluding my exposition on McDowell, it becomes apparent that 
McDowell’s more phenomenologically inclined view on the intentional-
ity towards objects and Kant’s transcendental analysis of the possibility 
of synthetic a priori knowledge claims articulated in judgements, given 
the actuality of such knowledge claims, constitute two different perspec-
tives. In Kant’s account the perspective is consistently from the vantage 
point of the judging subject that makes empirical claims about objects 
and is aware of so judging, whereas McDowell’s view shows more a kind 
of two-stage bottom-up analysis from perception, in which the self-
conscious subject does not (yet) figure; indeed, he makes it clear that 
non-propositional experience, that is, the non-discursively “bringing 
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our surroundings into view” in intuition, “is not taking things to be so” 
(McDowell 2009b:269; emphasis added), which is what we first do in 
judgements. On this reading, although McDowell contends that both 
intuition and judgement have the same conceptual content, one can 
have an intuition of an object as red, say, entitling one to judge that 
the thing perceived is so, without in fact having to explicitly judge that 
the object is so; only the latter activity entails the possibility of explicit 
rational reflection.29
The deflationary reading of the role of subjectivity for the actu-
alisation of the connection in the representational material or sensory 
content of an intuition, and the failure to heed the a priori nature of 
synthesis, is also characteristic for an interpretation that is at least in 
one important sense diametrically opposed to McDowell’s conceptual-
ist construal of the relation between concepts and intuition. In the next 
two sections I expand on that reading.
5.3  Hanna’s Nonconceptualism
Against the traditionally conceptualist reading of Kant’s argument about 
the relation between concept and intuition, Hanna (2005, 2008)30 
defends the existence of non-conceptual content. According to Hanna, 
the thesis of the nonconceptuality of mental content (hereafter noncon-
ceptualism for short) rests on the idea
that representational content is neither solely nor wholly determined by 
our conceptual capacities, and that at least some contents are both solely 
and wholly determined by nonconceptual capacities and can be shared by 
human and non-human animals alike. (2008:42)
Hanna pits this thesis against the thesis of conceptualism, which says that 
mental content is wholly determined by conceptual capacities and that 
the psychological states of non-human beings (animals) lack mental (rep-
resentational) content.31 Hanna (2008:44) asserts that perceptual states 
exist whose representational content is not, not even in principle, concep-











Hanna provides philosophical evidence independently of the Kantian 
context, but he also contends that the existence of such states can 
be proven by virtue of the very passage from the Critique quoted by 
McDowell in support of his conceptualism, viz. that “[t]houghts without 
content are empty [and] intuitions without concepts are blind” (B75). On 
the basis of this and other passages (e.g. B122–3; see further below the 
discussion in Sect. 5.5), Hanna regards Kant not only, like most interpret-
ers of Kant, as the founder of conceptualism, but also and foremost as the 
founder of nonconceptualism. According to nonconceptualism, intuitions 
can indeed be given without concepts being required, just as concepts are 
thinkable without (sensible) intuition.
Hanna (2008:45–46) aims at a “bottom-up” theory of human ration-
ality. That is to say, he has in mind an analysis of the
two-way ladder by which the world is consciously delivered up from 
embodied animal experience to self-conscious thought and action- 
oriented deliberation, and then is downwardly transformed by our think-
ing and action under universal a priori norms. (Hanna 2008:62–63)
To this end, he distinguishes between first-person information 
 processing and subpersonal information processing. Although it is 
nonconceptual and non-self-conscious, subpersonal information pro-
cessing takes place from the first-person perspective and involves 
consciousness (Hanna 2008:59). Hanna argues for the distinction 
between self-consciousness and “sensorimotor subjectivity” (2008:59), 
which is the primitive capacity of conscious, neurobiological beings 
and which is based on primitive bodily consciousness, such as proprio-
ception, kinaesthesia, orientation, feeling of pain, etc. The central, and 
valid, philosophical point that Hanna makes concerns the fact that 
“self-consciousness or self-reflection requires sensorimotor subjectiv-
ity, but sensorimotor subjectivity does not require self-consciousness or 
 self-reflection” (2008:59).
Confirmation of this viewpoint is provided by the famous case of 
blind-sight patients who are able to perform acts of which they are at 
the same time not self-aware of performing them. It would be very 
implausible to assume that such patients “are mere robots in the blind 
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areas of their self-conscious visual fields” (Hanna 2008:60–61). Hanna 
associates this with Kant’s notion of blind intuition (B75–6). An intui-
tion is blind if a self-conscious, conceptual processing of information 
does not take place, but at the same time such an intuition is repre-
sentational content which involves sensorimotor subjectivity in what 
Kant calls inner sense. According to Hanna, an intuition is always 
conscious mental content and also directly refers to an object. Blind 
intuition is “essentially non-conceptual content” (Hanna 2008:62).32 
Nonconceptual content is characterised by its own “lower-level sponta-
neity” (Hanna 2008:62), which Hanna associates with Kant’s synthesis 
speciosa or figurative synthesis. Hanna emphasises that the “lower-level 
spontaneity” is irreducible to “higher-level spontaneity”, the synthe-
sis performed by the understanding or the synthesis intellectualis. Also, 
Hanna argues that “lower-level spontaneity”, which knows its own nor-
mativity, is the “necessary ground” for the rational spontaneity of the 
higher level, and that both nonconceptual and conceptual content “are 
complementary to one another in the constitution of atomic or basic 
perceptual judgments, or what Kant calls ‘judgments of experience’” 
(2008:62).
Hanna’s arguments for the existence of nonconceptual content—one 
of them is a very illuminating account of Kant’s early argument about 
incongruent counterparts (2008:53ff.)—are sound and in my view 
convincing. However, his more specific views on Kant in respect of the 
issues at stake, especially the alleged distinction between “lower-level” 
and “higher-level” spontaneity, is seriously problematic, both philo-
sophically and as an interpretation of Kant. Interpretatively, it would be 
difficult, on Hanna’s reading, to explain why Kant says that it is “one 
and the same spontaneity that, there under the name of imagination and 
here under the name of understanding, brings combination into the 
manifold of intuition” (B162n.; emphasis added). Hanna postulates the 
idea that the Sellarsian space of reasons is nothing but “a discursive—
that is, a conceptual, judgment-driven, and linguistic—and a priori 
normative superstructure built on the platform of essentially non-concep-
tual embodied animal experience” (2008:63; emphasis added). If this 
were indeed the case—and the language used is significant—then, as 











experience” would be the epistemically relevant, foundational ground of 
all rational experience and knowledge; put differently, essentially non-
conceptual content would be the exogenous normative constraint of 
conceptuality.
This is in stark contrast to McDowell’s view, who as we have seen 
maintains that the role of intuition or receptivity cannot be regarded as 
exercising a normative constraint on our rational claims from the outside. 
Intuition does not play a constraining role on our conceptuality exog-
enously, supposedly in a non-conceptual way. The philosophically more 
pertinent question is how something nonconceptual can in fact be the 
explanatory, let alone the justificatory ground of the conceptual without 
falling back into an unwelcome foundationalism, which invites all kinds 
of vicious infinite regress. McDowell’s conceptualist reading does not 
suffer from this problem, even if it is true that he misapprehends Kant’s 
emphasis on the activity of our rational capacities which connect con-
cepts with intuition, that is, the ineliminable role of subjective agency.
Hanna cannot explain what it is that connects two irreducible and 
essentially different things, namely, the essentially nonconceptual—i.e. 
“embodied animal experience”—with what is essentially conceptual—
i.e. rational thought and “action-oriented deliberation”—in such a 
way that together they yield objective knowledge. The main philo-
sophical problem comes down to being able to explain how the two 
 irreducibly separable constituents of knowledge, nonconceptual sensi-
ble  content and the conceptual, do link up so that knowledge can arise 
from it. This is especially pertinent when the Kantian terminology of 
 figurative  synthesis and intellectual synthesis is employed, for regardless 
of their exact nature Kant at any rate means these differentiable forms 
of  synthesis clearly as operating only in their conjunction. If, as Hanna 
suggests, figurative synthesis as the lower-level spontaneity corresponds 
to the nonconceptual and intellectual synthesis as the higher-level spon-
taneity corresponds to the conceptual, and both are separable, then the 
operative question is: What connects the figurative synthesis with the 
intellectual synthesis such that a proper judgement ensues? Which fur-
ther synthesis is responsible for their synthesis? And how does the threat 
of an infinite regress here relate to Kant’s view that the synthesis at issue 
in TD is an a priori and transcendental synthesis, that is, an original 
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synthesis which grounds any other empirical synthesis and which itself 
does not depend on an even more original synthesis but should rather be 
seen as a regress-stopper?33
If Hanna were right that figurative synthesis is the necessary ground 
of intellectual synthesis (2008:62), then it would seem that the lower-
level spontaneity grounds the higher-level spontaneity, which given the 
specifics of spontaneity—namely, a self-activity (B130) or causality that 
is itself uncaused (cf. B430; A533/B561; A445ff./B473ff.)—seems odd 
to say the least. How does this work? This would surely be to reverse 
the order of what is ground and what is grounded. How can something 
that is not caused by anything except itself be grounded in something 
other that is in any case not more fundamental or original (and in fact, is 
rather less fundamental)?34 At any rate, it conflicts with Kant’s view that 
a priori synthesis is the spontaneous act or “self-activity” of the under-
standing (B130; B132; B150); there is nothing, certainly not a puta-
tive “lower-level” spontaneity, which can ground it, for if there were it 
would cancel out its very originality. If Hanna intends this grounding to 
mean that intellectual synthesis, or, the higher-level spontaneity simply 
latches onto the lower-level, more primitive spontaneity, which suppos-
edly grounds the former, then one can hardly speak of spontaneity in 
the proper sense of the term anymore (or it should be in terms of merely 
relative spontaneity; see again the discussion in Chap. 3).
A distinction between a priori synthesis and actual causal connec-
tions, a posteriori syntheses, must be heeded. The fact that essentially 
nonconceptual mental content exists does not eo ipso imply that this 
content is synthesised content in Kant’s sense—i.e. synthesised a priori, 
that is, synthesised by virtue of necessary synthesis. A proof of the exist-
ence of nonconceptual mental content follows analytically from Kant’s 
argument for the unity of self-consciousness. In accordance with the 
principle of apperception (B131–2), not all conscious content is ana-
lytically unified content, namely mental content that is something for 
me, I being the identical subject aware of my representations as my own. 
Hence, given that analytically unified mental content requires the cate-
gories, mental content that is not so unified is nonconceptual content.35 
But the same argument will also show that it logically follows that such 












given the rigorous coextensivity of the analytic and synthetic unities of 
apperception (cf. B133).36 So nonconceptual content cannot be content 
synthesised by figurative synthesis. Hanna’s assertion that essentially 
nonconceptual mental content is characterised at least by figurative syn-
thesis is not based on Kant’s own argumentation. Although, given the 
two-step structure of the argument of TD, intellectual synthesis and fig-
urative synthesis are formally distinguishable, figurative synthesis is not 
really possible without intellectual synthesis having been satisfied, for 
the act of figurative synthesis is the act of the same understanding which 
operates both on the “intellectual” or conceptual level of a judgement 
and the level of “intuition” in a judgement (see A79/B104–5). A more 
in-depth defence of my claims is required than I can provide here,37 
but at any rate the passage we have been discussing in the preceding 
 sections, at B151–2, makes sufficiently clear that figurative synthesis 
does not come apart from intellectual synthesis, since  figurative synthe-
sis is the effect of the understanding’s own act of synthesis (intellectual 
synthesis). If you remove intellectual synthesis, you remove figurative 
synthesis.
One could argue that, in a formal analysis, it would be possible to 
have an intellectual synthesis that does not imply the instantiation of a 
figurative synthesis if, for example, one abstracts from the application 
of the categories to a spatiotemporal sensible manifold and considers 
discursive modes of cognition that make use of a different way of sche-
matising (cf. B148–9). But the reverse does not hold: one cannot have 
a figurative synthesis, even analyse it, without presupposing the  effective 
instantiation of an intellectual synthesis, since the latter is a necessary 
condition for the former. It should also be pointed out that—at any 
rate in Kant’s internalist perspective—such mental contents that are 
nonconceptual are as such epistemically irrelevant, as indeed McDowell 
maintains, because they are “nothing to” the self-conscious subject, the 
conscious ‘I’ (B131–2). McDowell rightly observes that “[w]ithout the 
higher faculty, sensibility can yield at most the representations, merely 
associatively ordered and so not amounting to cognitions, that Kant 
allows to non-rational animals” (2009a:119), although I should like to 
qualify this to the extent that such merely associatively ordered repre-
sentations occur, de facto and not just hypothetically, also in rational 
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animals, human beings. In other words, nonconceptual content has as 
such no epistemically or transcendentally relevant role to play whatso-
ever—although of course de facto given sensory content has such a role, 
just insofar as it must be assumed to be given on pain of there not being 
knowledge at all; but this requirement is of course not denied even by 
(strong) conceptualists.
5.4  Allais’s Nonconceptualism
In her original article on nonconceptual content in relation to the repre-
sentation of space (Allais 2009), Allais reacts against the standard read-
ing of Kant’s theory of the a priori forms of intuition as the condition of 
the representation of particular objects, and the way concepts are said to 
be involved in this. This reading amounts to believing that
we cannot be perceptually presented with, or represent, particular 
things independently of our applying, or having the ability to apply, 
 concepts, and in particular the categories, to these particulars […].  
(Allais 2009:384)
Like Hanna, Allais criticises the view that no mental representational 
content exists independently of concepts. Allais contends that for 
Kant it is not necessary to apply concepts to have external particular 
objects presented to one in intuition. She emphasises that the role of 
intuition consists precisely in presenting us with particular objects and 
that intuition plays this role independently of conceptuality. In this 
way, Allais (2009:384–385) goes against McDowell’s (1996:9) asser-
tion that intuition does not make an “even notionally separate contri-
bution to cognition”.
Similarly to Hanna, Allais argues for the existence of (relatively) non-
conceptual content.38 Allais’s thesis is that although it cannot be denied 
that actual intuitions must be conceptualised in order to yield knowl-
edge, it must be denied that intuitions must be conceptualised in order 
to present us with objects. To claim the latter, namely that intuitions 












argue for “strong conceptualism” (Allais 2009:386). In opposition to 
McDowell, Allais argues that intuition does make a separable contribu-
tion to cognition, which consists in the fact that intuition perceptually 
provides us with individuals, particular objects, which concepts can-
not do. Allais emphasises Kant’s definition of intuition as that which, 
in contrast to a concept, refers immediately to a particular, singular 
object (cf. A320/B377; A68/B93; A19/B33; B47/A3239). The thesis 
of the blindness of intuition (A51/B75) does not mean, according to 
Allais (2009:393), that an intuition has no representational value or 
function. On the contrary, it belongs to the definition of an intuition 
that it gives us the object.40 Allais points out that for an intuition and 
hence for the perception of a particular object the use of concepts as 
general rules, as constituents of judgements and thus of the understand-
ing, is not required.41 Intuition provides or gives us the object about 
which we think and it is only in the second instance that the concept 
enables us to think about the object, or to make judgements about it 
(Allais 2009:390). This view is confirmed by what Kant writes in his 
later, unpublished Prize Essay:
By the intuition that accords with a concept the object is given; with-
out that it is merely thought. By this mere intuition without concept the 
object is given, indeed, but not thought; by the concept without corre-
sponding intuition it is thought but not given; thus in both cases it is not 
known. (FM, 20:325 [Kant 2002:406])
In contrast to McDowell and Sellars, Allais believes it is important to 
acknowledge that Kant understands the epistemic role of intuition as 
such not as merely causal or that intuition would only have an informa-
tion-processing role. Intuition, by “giving us objects”, enables, and so 
is partly responsible for, objectively valid knowledge (Allais 2009:391). 
However, although Kant sees intuition as an indispensable source for 
knowledge, I believe Allais, like Hanna, goes beyond Kant by suggesting 
that it is intuition that enables the objective reference for our knowledge 
claims, since objective validity, for Kant, is always and only a function 
of judgement, hence a function of our conceptuality, not of intuition. 
It is only in judgement that we achieve genuine reference to objects.42 
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In her defence, it should be pointed out though that Allais (2009:405) 
makes an important distinction between being presented with objects 
and the presentation of an object as object, which “the non- concept- 
having creature is arguably not in a position” to do (cf. Allais 2009: 
407, 413); the presentation with objects would then be a function of 
intuition, whereas the representation of an object as object would be a 
function solely of the understanding or conceptuality.
That intuition fulfils an epistemic role independently of conceptu-
ality implies, according to Allais (2009:394), that intuition itself must 
be attributed a nonconceptual mental processing function. Allais con-
nects this processing function with Kant’s synthesis (2009:395). Like 
Hanna, she associates intuition with figurative synthesis. She considers 
the possible objection that if intuition requires synthesis and synthesis is 
always governed by concepts, then intuition must itself also already be 
conceptual content, just as Kantian conceptualists argue. Allais’s reply 
is that synthesising is not yet or not the same as conceptualising and 
that “[a]lthough concepts always involve synthesis, it does not follow 
that synthesis always involves concepts” (2009:396n.35). According to 
Allais, then, intuition indeed requires synthesis, but synthesis itself is 
not already conceptual. Allais writes:
To say that we perform syntheses that are governed by the categories (and 
other concepts), and indeed that we must do this if we are to be able to 
apply the categories (and other concepts), is not to say that synthesis per 
se is governed by concepts […]. (2009:396)43
Allais is right that the fact that concepts always require synthesis does 
not imply that synthesis always requires concepts only if she means by 
the latter that synthesis per se requires “other concepts”, i.e. empirical 
concepts. However, I take it that Allais really means that synthesis does 
not require the categories, not just empirical concepts. Allais is ambigu-
ous here about which kind of ‘concept’ is at issue. (Also the oft-used 
but vague terminology of “governed by” is not helpful here.) If she 
means ‘empirical concept’ or just the ‘analytic unity of a common mark’ 
shared by a multiplicity of representations—the concept <red>, say, 












<Labour>—then of course synthesis is not conceptual and so does not 
require concepts, for a synthetic unity is by definition not an analytic 
unity, let alone an empirical concept. However, in the context of TD 
Kant means ‘concept’ as ‘pure concept’ or as “consciousness of this unity 
of synthesis” (A103), hence as category.
The question regarding the use of empirical concepts, and whether 
or not they are necessary for the possibility of having an intuition, is 
not germane to the central question whether figurative synthesis is or 
is not amenable to categorial determination.44 However, the view that 
“synthesis per se” is not “governed” by, or does not require, the cate-
gories, as Allais thinks, must be considered mistaken. That according 
to Allais synthesis supposedly is not already conceptual would at least 
appear to be in conflict with Kant’s assertion in one of his Reflexionen 
from the 1780s, where transcendental synthesis of the imagination is 
said  minimally to involve “a concept of the object in general”:
The transcendental synthesis of the imagination pertains solely to the 
unity of apperception in the synthesis of the manifold in general through 
the imagination. Through that a concept of the object in general is con-
ceived in accordance with the different kinds of transcendental synthesis. 
(LBl, B 12, 23:18 [Kant 2005:258])45
That Allais does believe that synthesis and categories can come separate 
shows her misunderstanding regarding the intimate relation between a pri-
ori synthesis and the categories, as if a priori synthesis and categorial deter-
mination were, or rested on, two wholly separable functions. Rather, the 
set of categories just is the set of rules for synthesis. Take these Reflexionen:
Now the categories are nothing other than the representations of some-
thing (appearance) in general so far as it is represented through transcen-
dental synthesis of imagination […].
The manifold, however, cannot thoroughly belong to one apperception 
except by means of a thoroughgoing synthesis of imagination and its 
functions in one consciousness. This transcendental unity in the synthe-
sis of imagination is thus an a priori unity under which all appearances 
must stand. Those [i.e., den Functionen derselben = the functions of the 
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synthesis of imagination] however are the categories, thus the categories 
express the necessary unity of apperception under which all appearances 
belong insofar as they belong to one cognition a priori and necessarily. 
(LBl B 12, 23:19 [Kant 2005:259])
That the a priori synthesis of the imagination in sensibility and categorial 
determination are not separable is further made clear by the Leitfaden: a 
priori synthesis is precisely the way (“the same function”) in which catego-
rial determination takes place, on two levels simultaneously, conceptually 
(intellectual synthesis) and in the sensible content of intuition (figurative 
synthesis). In any given empirical judgement, a priori synthesis precisely 
is the ‘application’ or ‘schematisation’ of the categories to/in intuition, so 
that a priori synthesis and categorial determination are coextensive in all 
possible cases of such judgements. The standard reading is that synthesis 
is an activity that is separate or separable from the set of categories itself or 
indeed from categorial determination, but that makes it unintelligible how 
supposedly by virtue of synthesis the categories get ‘applied’ (if ‘applied’ is 
the proper term). If indeed synthesis and categorial determination were 
separable functions, which are not necessarily coextensive in all cases, as 
Allais suggests, the question arises as to which function other than synthe-
sis—and, lest we forget, we are talking a priori synthesis here, naturally—
would perform the unification of the synthesis (of the imagination) and 
the categories. This leads inevitably to an infinite regress. The categories 
being so many modes of synthesising pre-given manifolds in intuition 
(Prol, 4:305; LBl B 12, 23:19) and the act of synthesis being the com-
bined set of these modes of synthesising, by implication synthesis cannot 
be separate from, and so by definition always requires, the categories.46
Importantly, Kant’s procedure in the B-Deduction is such that the 
argument of the ‘second step’, which concerns the analysis of the possi-
bility of knowledge of spatiotemporal objects, is part of the overall argu-
ment about the constitutive elements of possible experience. In a certain 
respect, the argument of the ‘second step’ is of course independent of 
the argument of the ‘first step’, but the order of reasoning is clearly from 
the analysis of the intellectual synthesis in the ‘first step’ to the ‘second 
step’s argument about figurative synthesis.47 Intellectual synthesis is 












a necessary condition of the former. Therefore, there cannot be any 
figurative synthesis (in the sense of Kant’s a priori synthesis of the tran-
scendental imagination, which is at issue in the ‘second step’) that does 
not presuppose an intellectual synthesis.
Purely formally, in the context of the analysis of TD, there can be an 
intellectual synthesis without figurative synthesis, namely when we con-
sider forms of discursive synthesis that do not rely on the kind of sensibility 
the human understanding relies on (cf. B149–50), and so requires a differ-
ent given intuition to perform its act of synthesising, or indeed, when we 
study the ‘first step’ of the B-Deduction in abstraction from the ‘second 
step’ (as I myself did in Schulting 2012b). However, a figurative synthesis 
always presupposes the intellectual synthesis, precisely because it is a more 
particular instantiation of the intellectual synthesis in human sensibility; as 
Kant puts it, figurative synthesis is “an effect of the understanding on sen-
sibility and its [desselben] first application […] to objects of the intuition 
that is possible for us” (B152; emphasis added). The figurative synthesis is 
as much an activity carried out by the understanding as is the intellectual 
synthesis, which is the Verstandesverbindung that is “thought in the mere 
category in regard to the manifold of an intuition in general” (B151). In 
fact, given that the figurative synthesis is an effect of the understanding on 
sensibility, and given that the understanding is the intellectual synthesis in 
abstraction from empirical intuition (B152),48 the figurative synthesis is 
the intellectual synthesis, as carried out in sensibility, in the context of an 
actual empirical judgement. Therefore, a figurative synthesis that would be 
independent of the understanding is simply impossible. The putative inde-
pendence of figurative synthesis from the understanding is directly refuted 
by a passage in B164, where Kant affirms that, with respect to the unity of 
the intellectual synthesis of a sensible intuition, the imagination “depends 
on the understanding”.
Apart from interpretative questions, if figurative synthesis were to be 
something wholly different from categorial determination, that is, intel-
lectual synthesis, then the question would arise—the same question that 
arose with Hanna’s construal—as to how figurative synthesis is in its 
turn synthesised with categorial determination or intellectual synthesis, 
landing us in a vicious infinite regress, the regress that a priori, original 
synthesis was precisely designed to block.
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Although, as Allais acknowledges, Kant makes it clear at 
B129–30 that “all combination […] is an action of the understanding” 
(emphasis added),49 Allais relies on Kant’s account of synthesis in the 
A-Deduction, where Kant more explicitly differentiates the various 
forms of synthesis, ostensibly only one of which involves concepts, 
namely the synthesis of recognition; she takes this differentiation to 
confirm her understanding of intuitional or figurative synthesis, which 
is identical to the synthesis of the imagination, as nonconceptual. 
Allais also emphasises Kant’s remark in the run-up to TD, after Kant 
has defined ‘synthesis’, that synthesis is the effect of the imagination, “a 
blind though indispensable function of the soul” (B103/A78). (Notice, 
however, that in the margin of his own copy of the A-edition of the 
Critique Kant substituted “understanding” for “soul”, which is sig-
nificant to say the least and points to his refashioning of the argument 
in the B-edition, although it should be noted that he did not in fact 
replace “soul” in the parallel passage in the B-edition.) It might appear 
odd for Kant to make the distinction in B103 between synthesis in gen-
eral and “to bring this synthesis to concepts” if both were indeed to be 
seen as functions of the same understanding. Nevertheless, in conform-
ity with the Leitfaden, it is precisely Kant’s claim that one function of 
the understanding brings about two syntheses, on both the conceptual 
level and in intuition, and at the same time (not separately and con-
secutively). More decisively, as I argued above, in the B-Deduction Kant 
speaks explicitly of the productive imagination or figurative synthesis as 
an “effect of the understanding” (B152; emphasis added).
But also in the A-Deduction and before, there is evidence on the 
basis of which it is questionable to regard each element of the three-
fold synthesis as a separable source of knowledge. Take this striking 
passage from the Duisburg Nachlass, written some 6 years before the 
A-Deduction:
The synthesis contains the relation of appearances not in the perception 
but in the concept. That all relation in perception nevertheless presup-
poses a relation in the concept indicates that the mind contains in itself 
the universal and sufficient source of synthesis and all appearances are 












In the A-Deduction, Kant clearly aims at providing a regressive analysis 
of knowledge by explaining the “threefold synthesis, which is necessar-
ily found in all cognition” (A97), where knowledge is the explanandum 
and synthesis the explanans. Also, Kant argues that the synthesis of 
apprehension and the synthesis of reproduction of the imagination are 
“inseparably bound” (A102; trans. Kemp Smith) and that without rec-
ognition in the concept “all reproduction in the series of representations 
would be in vain” (A103). This suggests that neither syntheses can oper-
ate singly, in isolation from the others. However, A124 appears to lend 
support to Allais’s reading. There, Kant argues that it is first by means of 
the unity of apperception that “concepts that belong to the understand-
ing can come about, but only by means of the imagination in relation 
to the sensible intuition”, and that the unity of apperception “must be 
added to the pure imagination in order to make its function intel-
lectual”. He continues: “For in itself the synthesis of the imagination, 
although exercised a priori, is nevertheless always sensible, for it com-
bines the manifold only as it appears in intuition […]” (boldface mine). 
However, I contend that this passage must be read in the context of the 
regressive analysis of the possibility of knowledge, not as if the unity of 
apperception, and hence the categories, and the imagination were to be 
seen as separably instantiated (see further Chap. 6).
Understandably, Allais wants to keep both syntheses, intellectual and 
figurative, separate, since like Hanna she insists on two modes of synthe-
sising that are not necessarily coextensive or do not necessarily entail each 
other, and only one of which is due to the conceptual capacities of the 
understanding, which comports with the strict distinction that she empha-
sises between nonconceptual content, or the intuition of particulars, and 
concepts. In her and Hanna’s nonconceptual construal of intuition, intui-
tion must in and of itself contain a synthetic connection between the rep-
resentations that constitute its content (its object-reference) independently 
of the categories and hence independently of intellectual synthesis. This 
function of an independent synthetic connection in intuition is putatively 
carried out by figurative synthesis. Figurative synthesis performs this func-
tion separably from the understanding and its synthetic activity.
In her most recent work (Allais 2015, 2016), it seems to me that Allais 
has not dramatically changed her view, although she now emphasises, 











226     5 Problems of Kantian Nonconceptualism …
importantly, that not all forms of binding are forms of synthesis in Kant’s 
strong sense, so that intuition can be characterised by a kind of combina-
tion (“binding”, as Allais calls it, referring to cognitive or empirical psy-
chology) that is short of being a priori synthesis in Kant’s sense.50 But 
she still appears to insist that there are pre-conceptual forms of synthe-
sis in Kant’s sense, such as the synthesis of the imagination, that may be 
required for the unity of intuition, but do not involve the categories (Allais 
2015). This reading overly differentiates, as did her earlier reading (2009), 
between synthesis and the categories as applied to sensibility. However, 
Allais (2015:267) also acknowledges that categories just are rules of pure 
or a priori synthesis. But if this is true, it stands to reason to deny that, 
at least in the context of TD, rules of pure or a priori synthesis are sep-
arable from the categories, unless there are different kinds, or modes of 
application, of rules of pure or a priori synthesis; but if there are different 
kinds, or modes of application, of rules of pure or a priori synthesis, then 
another, higher kind of pure synthesis would be required to synthesise the 
different kinds, or modes of application, of rules of pure or a priori syn-
thesis, and so forth. An infinite regress threatens. Thus, a priori or pure 
synthesis cannot be considered separable from the categories.
In the next section, I look at a crucial passage in the run-up to the 
actual argument of TD, namely, a passage which is often viewed as 
strong evidence for a nonconceptualist reading of TD. I believe that 
there are good grounds for this view. But the passage is not uncon-
troversial. Whereas nonconceptualists point out that here Kant grants 
the real possibility of intuitions that are not subsumed or amenable to 
subsumption under the categories, conceptualists argue that Kant only 
entertains the hypothetical possibility of appearances (or intuitions) not 
conforming to the categories.
5.5  Reading A89–91/B122–3 Anew: 
Hypothetical or Real Possibility?
I concur with the central contention of Hanna’s and Allais’s argumenta-
tion that Kant is essentially a nonconceptualist and not a conceptualist 












conceptual content, nor are conceptual capacities required for having 
an intuition of particulars (as long as these are seen as indeterminate 
objects). However, I object to the interpretation of intuition as in and 
of itself having objective validity, as Hanna (2005:257) and presumably 
Allais (2009:391, 393)51 believe, or that an intuition objectively refers, 
where reference implies designation of an individual or a particular. 
For Kant, although intuition indeed depends on an object being given 
(V-Met/Schön, 28:484; B72), objectivity or objective validity strictly 
speaking is solely a function of judgement (B141–2), and, importantly, 
the individuality or particularity of an object cannot be established prior 
to an act of judgement (by means of the rules of apperception). As I 
have argued above, I also differ from Hanna and Allais in that I do not 
believe that figurative synthesis and intellectual synthesis can be shared 
out between intuition and concept such that intuition is by definition 
characterised by figurative synthesis, or that the synthesis of intuition 
can be seen as separable from the synthesis by means of concepts (i.e. 
the categories). Not all intuition is synthesised and only those intuitions 
are synthesised which are part of a judgement.52 Neither are figurative 
and intellectual synthesis two de re separable instances of syntheses or 
ways of synthesising. They are just formally distinguishable aspects of 
one instance of synthesising that ensues from an operation of the under-
standing, which manifests itself on both the sensible and intellectual 
levels of a judgement, in judgement. Figurative synthesis is not a dif-
ferent or distinct act of synthesising from intellectual synthesis. There 
is just one transcendental synthesis, which binds intuition and con-
cept together. For McDowell, this is not a problem as he believes that 
in principle each intuition already shows the same “togetherness” that 
is manifest in a conceptual episode, whose “togetherness” is shown in 
the propositional structure of judgement. Insofar as it concerns a case of 
objective knowledge, my own reading is closer to McDowell’s (notwith-
standing the problems with his reading flagged earlier in Sect. 5.3).
Nevertheless, I believe Allais is right to insist that the necessary 
“mutual dependence” (2009:399) of concept and intuition does not hold 
for the mere perception but only for the cognition of objects, whereby, 
unlike Allais, I understand cognition in terms of knowledge, not in 
terms of the mere thought of objects.53 The necessary conditions for the 
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perceptual presentation of particular objects are time and space, not the 
categories (Allais 2009:399–401). It should be observed though that 
space and time as forms of intuition are not the sufficient conditions for 
the presentation of particular objects in space and time. So the question 
is whether particular objects can be represented, or perceived, as distinct 
particulars objects in space and time by means of the forms of intuition 
alone, as Allais seems to believe (cf. Allais 2015). I would firmly negate 
that question (see Onof and Schulting 2015). The issue here is the differ-
ence between what are the conditions of intuition, which always depends 
on a given object in space, and the conditions of the perception of that 
given object as a spatially distinct object (I expand on this in Chap. 7).
Both Allais and Hanna rightly cite the passage at B122–3 in the 
Critique in support of their nonconceptualist reading of intuition. 
I believe this is indeed one of the most convincing passages in Kant’s 
work against strong conceptualism. Kant writes:
The categories of understanding […] do not represent the conditions under 
which objects are given in intuition. Objects may, therefore, appear to us 
without their being under the necessity of being related to the functions of 
understanding; and understanding need not, therefore, contain their a priori 
conditions. Thus a difficulty such as we did not meet with in the field of 
sensibility is here presented, namely, how subjective conditions of thought can 
have objective validity, that is, can furnish conditions of the possibility of all 
knowledge of objects. For appearances can certainly be given in intuition 
independently of functions of the understanding. […] That objects of sensi-
ble intuition must conform to the formal conditions of sensibility which lie 
a priori in the mind is evident, because otherwise they would not be objects 
for us. But that they must likewise conform to the conditions which the 
understanding requires for the synthetic unity of thought, is a conclusion 
the grounds of which are by no means so obvious. Appearances might very 
well be so constituted that the understanding should not find them to be 
in accordance with the conditions of its unity. Everything might be in such 
confusion that, for instance, in the series of appearances nothing presented 
itself which might yield a rule of synthesis and so answer to the concept of 
cause and effect. This concept would then be altogether empty, null, and 
meaningless. But since intuition stands in no need whatsoever of the func-
tions of thought, appearances would none the less present objects to our 












Often the emphasis in this passage from §13 in the run-up to TD is 
put on the ostensible merely hypothetical nature of the thought that 
Kant puts forward here, namely that “in the series of appearances noth-
ing presented itself which might yield a rule of synthesis and so answer 
to the concept of cause and effect”. Here, Kant would appear to argue 
that since in that case there can be no knowledge of an object it must be 
excluded that appearances would lie in disarray (cf. A111) and would 
not already show, at least in principle, the conceptual unity that is 
required for knowledge.
Hannah Ginsborg, who espouses a conceptualist reading of Kant, is 
typical in this respect. She writes in regard to B122–3:
If we abstract from the role of […] synthesis in perception then it does at 
least seem possible that appearances can be presented to us independently 
of the conditions of understanding, but once we have recognized the role 
of synthesis in perception, we are in a position to see that this apparent 
possibility is illusory. (Ginsborg 2008:71)55
Ginsborg believes that the possibility that Kant considers is merely 
hypothetical or counterfactual,56 and that he never considers this a real 
or metaphysical possibility, viz. that appearances would in fact be pre-
sented to us independently of the understanding and not structured by 
the understanding so as to yield knowledge. Perhaps Ginsborg means 
that appearances that have objective validity cannot be independent from 
the understanding, as it is the understanding which confers objective 
validity on them. And that is certainly right, because it is trivially true. 
But the way in which she puts it makes it appear as if she believes that 
all appearances whatever cannot be independent from the understand-
ing, regardless of the question about their objective validity. And that is 
clearly tantamount to an existential claim not licensed by Kant’s argu-
ment at B122–3.57 The existential claim underlying both weak and 
strong conceptualism comes down to the negative existential statement 
that sensory content that is in principle non-conceptualisable does not 
exist. Strong conceptualism, which states that sensory or conscious con-
tent must be conceptualised, must be distinguished from weak concep-
tualism, which states that although sensory or conscious content must 
be able to be conceptualised, it does not depend on conceptuality for its 
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existence. However defined, conceptualism in any case denies, in princi-
ple, that there could be sensory or conscious content (appearances) that 
is not conceptualisable; weak conceptualism only states that there could 
be de facto nonconceptualised content, but does not allow, in princi-
ple, that there could be content that is not conceptualisable or apt to 
conceptualisation. On weak conceptualism, any content at any rate nec-
essarily entails conceptualisation, even if there could be the occasional 
unconceptualised intuition. Both weak and strong conceptualism there-
fore conflict with essentialist content nonconceptualism, which argues 
that there are intuitions which resist conceptualisation in principle (that 
is, are not conceptualisable).
Conceptualism of both variants implies that we could somehow 
establish the sensory content’s or intuition’s disposition to being con-
ceptualised or being subsumable under concepts (categories), which 
on Kant’s Copernican hypothesis—that is, the hypothesis that we only 
know a priori of things “what we have put into them” (Bxviii)—we are 
in principle not able to do. On Kant’s account of what is possible to 
know, we cannot possibly know that there are not any sensory content 
or intuitions (any appearances) that elude conceptualisation, precisely 
because we only know of things what we have put into them before-
hand by virtue of a priori synthesis. And what cannot be determined 
by virtue of conceptualisation through a priori synthesis, can neither 
be known. The transcendental truth that the unity of understanding is 
necessary for a synthesis of causally linked appearances and hence for 
the possibility of knowledge does not imply the truth of the existen-
tial claim that all appearances necessarily conform to the unity of the 
understanding and synthetically hang together (in an a priori way). That 
we cannot make cognitive claims about objects but by employing con-
cepts and applying them to appearances does not in the least imply that 
appearances must be conceptualised (strong conceptualism) or even be 
subsumable under concepts (weak conceptualism).
But, in fact, Kant does not make the existential claim to the effect 
that the real possibility of appearances not conforming to the unity 
of the understanding would be excluded. (At least he does not here at 
B122–3; sometimes he does appear to make that claim, especially in 












end of the quoted passage at A89–91/B122–3, Kant clearly asserts that 
even if appearances were to lie in a chaos “[a]ppearances would none-
theless offer objects to our intuition, for intuition by no means requires 
the functions of thinking” (A90–1/B123). As Carl (1992:124n.20) sug-
gests, Kant’s talk of “objects” here must be taken in the broad sense, 
namely in the sense that objective perceptions are representations of 
objects (Gegenstände). “Objects” here means “[a]ppearances”, which “to 
the extent that as objects they are thought in accordance with the unity 
of the categories, are called phaenomena” (A248–9; emphasis added). 
All phenomena are appearances, but not all appearances are phenom-
ena, for not all appearances are “thought in accordance with the unity of 
the categories”. Appearances insofar as they are not phenomena in the 
sense defined, are those objects (Gegenstände) of which Kant speaks here 
at B122–3, and which are in no need of the functions of the under-
standing (i.e. are not “thought in accordance with the unity of the cat-
egories”). This, by implication, excludes the possibility that there would 
be objects that are phenomena which are in no need of the functions of 
the understanding, as this amounts to a contradiction, but it strongly 
suggests the real possibility of appearances that just amount to noncon-
ceptual content or blind intuition.
At A111, in a passage similar to the one at B123, Kant hypothesises 
about the possibility that “a swarm of appearances […] fill[s] up our 
soul without experience ever being able to arise from it”, whereby “all 
relation of cognition to objects would also disappear, since the appear-
ances would lack connection in accordance with universal and necessary 
laws” (cf. A122). In that case, “intuition without thought” ( gedanken-
lose Anschauung) would be possible, but it would “never [be] cognition 
[Erkenntniß ], and would therefore be as good as nothing for us”.59 
From the immediately preceding passage (A110), where he argues that 
“[t]here is only one experience, in which all perceptions are represented 
as in thoroughgoing and lawlike connection” (boldface mine), it appears 
that Kant excludes the possibility that one could have an epistemically 
relevant perception or intuition that does not belong to unitary experi-
ence grounded in “a transcendental ground of unity” (A111), but this 
does not imply that he excludes the real possibility of “intuition with-
out thought” (gedankenlose Anschauung). In fact, in the hypothetical 
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“swarm” case of a total lack of universal and necessary law-governedness, 
“intuition without thought” would still be really possible, but it would 
have no real relevance for us as cognisers.60
By contrast, with respect to the passage under discussion here (B122–
3), Brady Bowman has argued that Kant cannot rule out the logical 
possibility that appearances “appear to us without necessarily having a 
relation to the functions of the understanding”, but that he does rule 
out the “real” or “transcendental” possibility that “appearances and 
concepts come apart” (2011:422). That Kant cannot rule out the log-
ical possibility of them coming apart, is of course because objects are 
not analytically deducible from concepts: a world is conceivable, where 
objects do indeed come apart from the understanding. Likewise, Gomes 
(2014:6) argues that “we are not forced to treat the possibility expressed 
at A90/B123 as metaphysical”, i.e. as constituting a real possibility. 
According to Gomes, the indicative können in B122 (3:102.26) is com-
patible with “the three paragraphs which end that section (A89–92/
B122–4) operating under an assumed ‘for all we know’ operator”. In 
the text part that Gomes refers to (3:103.9–17), Kant employs the sub-
junctive.61 In light of the textual evidence, I believe that Bowman’s and 
Gomes’s interpretations are not compelling.
As we have seen with Ginsborg, it appears that some conceptual-
ists conflate <all appearances> and <all objects of possible experience> 
(see also Bowman 2011). On account of Kant’s theory of experience, 
it is analytically true that, necessarily, each and any object of possible 
experience is determined by the categories of the understanding, for 
an object is by definition a manifold of representations united by vir-
tue of the categories. However, ‘appearance’ and ‘object’ in the sense of 
its definition at B13762 are not equivalent terms. According to Kant’s 
definition at the outset of the Transcendental Aesthetic, an appear-
ance is an “undetermined” object of an empirical intuition (B34/A20), 
i.e. a manifold of an intuition that has not yet been united.63 Hence, 
an appearance, which is an intuition that has not yet been united, is 
not already objectively valid, against the view of Hanna (2008:258) 
and Allais (2009:391ff.), who claim that an intuition already by itself, 
intrinsically, refers objectively. The class of appearances is therefore 












class does not only contain all possible objects of experience, but also all 
those appearances which only have subjective validity and never attain 
to objectivity, ‘Praussian’ subjective objects, say (see Prauss 1971:16ff.), 
which thus do not belong to the latter class. Not all appearances are 
therefore from the outset, as mere empirical representations or “species 
of representation” (A372; trans. mine; cf. B242ff/A197ff.), related to 
the understanding, as the conceptualist believes. Or, not all appearances 
are phenomena.64
Secondly, the goal of TD concerns establishing the a priori rules 
under which our perceptions, which are not already by themselves cat-
egorially determined, stand under the categories so as to yield objec-
tive knowledge, that is, knowledge of a priori necessary law-governed 
connections. As Allais (2009:399) rightly insists, establishing the rules 
of intuition as such is not at issue in TD, since these had already been 
established in the Aesthetic. Therefore, a clear distinction must be 
heeded between the goal of the Aesthetic and that of TD, even if it is 
true that in the second half of TD, in the famous and much discussed 
note to B160–1, Kant seems to alter his view on the way in which time 
and space must be regarded.65 However, the argument there is that the 
unity of space, about which in the Aesthetic Kant still maintained that 
it belonged to sensibility, is first constituted by virtue of the synthetic act 
of the understanding insofar as an objective grasp of the unity of space 
is concerned. Space and time as such, as “forms of intuition”, them-
selves do not yet contain the synthetic unity which they only have as 
“formal intuitions” as a result of that synthetic act.66 This by no means 
implies that the a priori forms of space and time, which are the necessary 
forms of each and any intuition, are in and of themselves subject to the 
rules of the understanding or indeed show that synthetic unity which 
is required for objective knowledge of spatiotemporal objects.67 In other 
words, Kant’s goal in TD is precisely to show that despite the real gap 
between the forms of intuition and the functions of the understanding, intu-
itions or appearances are indeed subsumed under the functions of the 
understanding if and only if we apprehend, by means of our capacity to 
judge, appearances as objects for our understanding. That is, the claim is 
that intuitions or appearances are determined by the unifying functions 
of the understanding if and only if the understanding apprehends them 












234     5 Problems of Kantian Nonconceptualism …
as determined by its functions; the understanding can only determine 
what it apprehends as determined by its functions.
The biconditional nature of the above-formulated claim evinces the 
radically subjectivist standpoint of Kant’s theory of knowledge that I 
have been stressing in the preceding chapters. Determination and thus 
conceptualisation of intuitions is conditional on an a priori subjec-
tive act of determination, which is the act of synthesis that is expressed 
by transcendental apperception. If there is no such act, no concep-
tual determination of intuitions takes place. But this, of course, does 
not imply the negative existential claim that there could not be intu-
itions that amount to a form of subcognitive mental content, that is, 
merely subjectively valid perception, or appearances in the broad sense. 
Conceptualists (bar McDowell) tend to overestimate the scope of the 
transcendental subjectivity involved in cognitive determination and to 
ignore the conditional nature underlying it, which restricts the scope of 
the determinative function of subjectivity (that is, the conditional that 
“intuitions are determined by the functions of the understanding if and 
only if the understanding apprehends them as determined by them”). 
Nonconceptualists, on the other hand, either ignore, underestimate, 
or dismiss68 the subjective/active element of conceptual determination 
which first constitutes cognition or knowledge, and hence fail to explain 
how intuition and conceptuality do in fact connect up in actual cases of 
knowledge. By not considering Kant’s subjectivism, as I have defined it, 
they thus vitally fail to address the central explanatory goal of TD.
It is of course not the case that in TD Kant backtracks on the abso-
lute distinction between sensibility and the understanding. Instead of 
showing how to bridge the gap between intuition and concept, as some 
conceptualists appear to believe,69 Kant rather wants to demonstrate 
how from their union knowledge first arises. There is nothing essential 
about intuitions that would make them subsumable under the catego-
ries or which shows that they have a certain disposition to being so sub-
sumed. Precisely because nothing in terms of essential connections or a 
pre-established harmony, say, binds sensibility and the understanding, 
Kant is presented with the problem that requires TD, namely, given 
their irreducible distinction, how do sensibility and understanding link 












5.6  Conclusion: Kant’s Moderate 
Conceptualism
We have seen that the conceptualist position, both in its ‘weak’ and 
‘strong’ variants, is committed to a modally intemperate claim regarding 
the necessary conceptualisability of intuitions (or appearances), which is 
not warranted by Kant’s text in A89–91/B122–3. The modally intem-
perate claim says that
(M) Necessarily, all intuitions are subject to the categories as the con-
ceptual conditions under which knowledge of objects is possible (that is, 
intuitions either are or must be able to be subsumed under the categories)
M is tantamount to conceptualism (in either variant), the view that 
Hanna and Allais argue against. The analysis of B122–3 in Sect. 5.5 
showed that M cannot be correct. It is not true that for any and all intu-
itions it holds that, necessarily, they correspond or conform to concepts 
to yield cognition and hence are subject to the a priori rules of synthe-
sis constraining such cognition. If true, M would imply that we would 
know that, necessarily, all sensory content would be conformable to the 
universal relations among them that enable their connectedness as intui-
tions by means of which we know objects. This would mean that, as 
Kant writes, “we would be able to determine antecedently everything 
that can be an object for us at all”, in other words, that “we had com-
plete insight into all of our sensitivity and form” (Refl 5262 [1776–78], 
18:135 [Kant 2005:223]). But clearly we do not have “complete insight 
into all of our sensitivity”, and hence we cannot know that, necessar-
ily, all sensory content is connected in accordance with rules that enable 
knowledge.
Also Kant’s famous adage at A51/B75, which seems to assert the 
absolute inseparability or correspondence of concept and intuition, 
shows on further analysis that M cannot be right. For Kant writes 
towards the end of that passage that “[o]nly from their unification 
[i.e. the understanding and the senses, D.S.] can knowledge arise” 
(trans. emended). This suggests a hidden antecedent in the argument: 
it does not concern an absolutely necessary unity between intuition 
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and concept, which in fact would contradict Kant’s insistence on their 
irreducible difference (cf. B29), but a conditionally necessary unity.70
That only a conditionally necessary unity between intuition and con-
cept is at issue is conveyed by M*, which states:
(M*) Necessarily, if intuitions are to be seen as contributing to possible 
knowledge of objects, then intuitions are subsumed under the catego-
ries as the conceptual conditions under which knowledge of objects is 
 possible.
Kant reasons that if we take there to be knowledge, and given that 
knowledge consists of both concepts and intuitions and of their syn-
thetic unity, then we must assume that our sensibility corresponds to 
our conceptuality in accordance with a priori rules, for knowledge is 
only explainable from that correspondence.71 Note that Kant’s argu-
ment in TD is not conditional in the sense that the categories do not 
necessarily apply to all spatiotemporal objects. Rather, the argument 
is conditional in the sense that if there is knowledge of spatiotemporal 
objects, and given that sensible intuition or sensibility is our immedi-
ate access to these objects and in that sense to be seen as a necessary 
contribution to knowledge, then sensible intuition or sensibility must 
be seen as subject to the categories to cooperate in the constitution of 
such knowledge. And given that there is knowledge, sensible intuition 
or sensibility is thus subject to the categories. Importantly, this does 
not imply that all sensible intuition is subject to the categories simplic-
iter, or that, necessarily, sensible intuition is subject to the categories, or 
that, necessarily, sensible intuition is amenable to being subsumed under 
the categories, which is what Kant’s argument would be on account of 
M. Nor of course does this in and of itself show how sensible intuition 
is seen to be subject to the categories (the how question will be the topic 
of Chap. 7).
The conditional structure of the argument about the intuition- 
concept relation (M*) is consistent with the globally regressive  character 
of TD.72 The regressive character of TD is shown in the way that its 
argument takes the fact of experience (or knowledge) as a premise 











based on the idea that experience (or knowledge) is built up of two for-
mally separable elements, intuition and pure concepts, that constitute 
experience or knowledge to the extent that they are conjoined. Although 
Allais (2009:402) professes to base her reading on Ameriks’s (1978) 
regressive interpretation, her nonconceptualist reading of intuition as 
intrinsically characterised by figurative synthesis in sharp contrast to 
conceptuality as intrinsically characterised by intellectual synthesis, as 
we saw in Sect. 5.4, reveals a much too rigid view of Kant’s formal dis-
tinctions. By concentrating on the independence of intuition from the 
understanding, she skirts around the very crux of Kant’s theory of expe-
rience, namely, to explain how intuition and concepts together enable 
experience or knowledge, and how the formally separable elements are 
to be seen contributing to it together. The distinction between the dif-
ferent syntheses is not an ontological distinction between faculties or 
powers or ways of representing that either are or are not coextensive, 
whereby figurative synthesis (or any form of binding) is simply the syn-
thesis (or binding) of intuition in contrast to, and numerically distinct 
from, the intellectual synthesis of concepts through the understand-
ing. The differentiable syntheses are the joint necessary transcendental- 
logical conditions of knowledge which operate their functions integrally 
and cannot be shared out between intuition and the understanding. If 
we base our reading on the A-version of the threefold synthesis, no syn-
thesis performs its function separably from the other two syntheses for, 
as Kant indicates in the Leitfaden, that function is one and the same act 
of the understanding in judgement. Here lies the forte of Kant’s central 
argument for an original unity of the two stems of knowledge. At the 
same time, that argument is moderated by the fact that the conditional 
structure of M* precludes Kant from claiming that perception and 
intuition themselves are already conceptual or even proto-conceptual, 
or indeed amenable to being conceptualised, as Longuenesse appears to 
argue, when she says that a certain conatus, i.e. the capacity to judge, 
“pervades the totality of our sensible perceptions” (1998:196, 208). 
There is nothing about perception or intuition which shows that they 
have a conatus towards being conceptualised or judged about.
The central question in TD is and remains: What needs to be presup-
posed, in terms of a priori capacities, in order for knowledge to be possible? 
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Kant argues, on the basis of regressive analysis, that a synthesis of appre-
hension must at least be presupposed, but since such a synthesis of appre-
hension is inadequate for the constitution of knowledge, also a synthesis 
of reproduction is required, and since neither a synthesis of reproduction 
is sufficient, a further synthesis of recognition is required (for a detailed 
account of the argument of the threefold synthesis in A, see Chap. 6). Kant 
does not mean that each of these syntheses operates in separation from 
the others, or in abstraction from them, as if it concerned the consecu-
tive phases of an underlying psychological process that could either result 
or fail to result in knowledge, as McDowell and latterly Pippin appear to 
think (see Sect. 5.2). This would immediately produce an infinite regress 
problem. That is to say, if synthesis of apprehension were to be operated 
separately, what would see to it that it becomes a synthesis of reproduc-
tion? Which more originary synthesis would be responsible for the syn-
thesis of apprehension becoming a synthesis of reproduction? This surely 
cannot non-question-beggingly be the synthesis of reproduction itself. But 
perhaps it is the synthesis of recognition that is the more originary syn-
thesis that connects the two together. But what then is responsible for the 
synthesis of recognition effectively becoming a well-formed proposition 
that articulates a judgement rather than just being a reproduction of more 
or less ordered series of sensations? Or is the synthesis of recognition the 
 effective judgement?73
One may argue that the threat of a vicious regress still haunts the 
account in the A-Deduction. To remove any semblance of regress or 
misplaced psychology, I believe that in the B-Deduction Kant relin-
quishes the explicit threefold character of synthesis (but see Chap. 6 
for a reading of the threefold synthesis that is compatible with the 
B-Deduction account). In complete conformity with the Leitfaden 
(A79/B104–5) and confirming my thesis of Kant’s radical subjectiv-
ism, in the B-Deduction the act of synthesis is attributed entirely to 
the understanding, which by means of one function establishes both 
a connection, or an intellectual synthesis, on the level of concepts 
(as formal unities) “by virtue of the analytical unity” and a connection, 
or a figurative synthesis, on the level of the content of concepts “by vir-
tue of synthetic unity”.74 The synthesis of apprehension is the figurative 











the effect of the intellectual synthesis of the understanding. Kant says 
that the imagination (a.k.a. figurative synthesis) is the mediating term 
between sensibility and the understanding (B164), which binds the 
two together (this will be argued in more detail in Chap. 7). But this 
does not mean that it has a separable intermediate status. McDowell 
comes closest to Kant’s meaning, when he asserts that the unity of the 
imagination is not “an amalgam, however intimately bound together, 
of components that belong severally to sensibility and understanding” 
(2009a:124).
However, unlike McDowell, Hanna and Allais are right in maintain-
ing that intuition as such is not necessarily or at least not yet categorially 
determined. There are intuitions that not only are not conceptualised de 
facto but also need not or indeed could not be conceptualised, because 
they are essentially nonconceptual and so resist conceptualisation. In 
line with Hanna’s and Allais’s nonconceptualism about intuition, it is 
also my view that intuition and concept are not, or at least need not 
be, coextensive; they are necessarily coextensive only in their connec-
tion in an actual judgement, in actual cases of knowledge, in conform-
ity with M*. It is the relation between intuition and concept which is 
conceptual, not intuition itself. That relation is established solely by a 
conceptual action that Kant calls the bringing to the concept of syn-
thesis (A78/B103–4), which results in judgement. McDowell’s unwar-
ranted quasi-Hegelian move is that he reads the capacity responsible for 
the possibility of judgement, which is a conceptual capacity, into sensi-
bility tout court.
However, contrary to what nonconceptualists such as Hanna (2008) 
believe, something that is essentially nonconceptual can hardly be 
seen as the a priori and necessary ground or basis of something that is 
essentially conceptual. Nor can nonconceptual content be seen as syn-
thesised content (in Kant’s sense) or indeed as objectively referring. 
Intuitions may be immediately related to a spatially given object, but 
they are not determinate perceptions of spatially distinct and distinguish-
able objects or particulars. No form of nonconceptualism can explain 
what is the a priori synthetic-unitary ground for two essentially differ-
ent elements, intuition and concept, for those instances in which intui-
tion and concepts are necessarily coextensive, namely when there is an 
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effective claim to knowledge, a judgement. This shows the failure of 
Kantian nonconceptualists to recognise Kant’s radically subjectivist posi-
tion about the possibility of knowledge. But what is undoubtedly true 
about the nonconceptualist position is that intuition is in and of itself 
not already conceptual, or in McDowell’s words an “actualization of con-
ceptual capacities”. Only in relation to the concept, as part of an actual 
judgement, and from the perspective of an epistemic agent, is intuition 
brought to the concept through an act of pure synthesis, an act of the 
judging subject.
In conclusion, Kant may be called a conceptualist with respect to the 
possibility of knowledge with the proviso that intuition is not in and 
of itself conceptual or even proto-conceptual. Bridging the gap between 
the essentially non-conceptual, intuition, and the conceptual constitutes 
of course the heart of Kant’s project in TD.
Notes
 1. In German it says: “dadurch überhaupt ein Gegenstand gedacht wird 
(die Kategorie)”, translated by Kemp Smith as “through which an 
object in general is thought (the category)”, which is apt since Kant 
means to refer to the notion of the unity of apperception as defining 
the concept of an object in general (cf. A109–10; A104–5), whereas in 
the sections that follow the quoted one, Kant aims to account for the a 
priori possibility of particular objects, namely, spatiotemporal objects of 
human sensibility.
 2. See Schulting (2012b) for a detailed account of the ‘first step’ of TD. 
See also Chaps. 2, 3 and 4 (this volume).
 3. More specifically, the terms ‘intuition’, ‘appearance’ and ‘sensible con-
tent’ can be defined in the following way. Intuition is Kant’s des-
ignation for a sensible way of cognising (B33/A19), which relates 
“immediately to the object” (B376ff./A320ff.; cf. V-Met/Schön, 
28:482, 484; Prol, 4:281), whereas for Kant sensory content, as the 
label says, points more directly to the empirical content of such cog-
nising, what Kant calls “sensation” or the “material” in an “appear-
ance”, which is the unbestimmte Gegenstand of an “empirical intuition” 











is “sensation” when it concerns a “modification of [one’s] state”, but 
cognition when it is a perception of something objective. And this is 
again subdivided into “intuition” and “concept”, so that it seems as if 
for Kant both “intuition” and “concept” are objective perceptions—
but see Wolff (1995:62–63), who asserts that “intuition” is not genu-
ine knowledge, which is confirmed by Kant’s position that only in their 
conjunction intuitions and concepts yield knowledge; cf. FM, 20:325: 
“Knowledge by means of concepts is called discursive, by means of intui-
tion, intuitive; in fact, knowledge requires the conjunction of the two, 
but each is named for the ground of determination to which I always 
primarily attend” (Kant 1983:181). See also V-Met/Volckmann, 28:404: 
“All our knowledge [Erkentniß ] consists of judgements and these must 
have an object, the mere intuition [bloße Anschauung] is not knowledge 
[Erkentniß ]” (trans. mine). As regards the term ‘appearance’, this can 
also be taken in two senses: either an appearance is just a “mere mode 
of representation [bloße Vorstellungsart]” (A372), i.e. an indeterminate 
object of an intuition, which as such is not distinguishable from the 
intuition, or an appearance is a phenomenon, namely, “to the extent 
that as object [it is] thought in accordance with the unity of the cat-
egories” (A248–9), i.e. an object as a unity of representations. All phe-
nomena are appearances in the first sense, but not all appearances are 
appearances in the second sense. I return to this latter aspect below, as 
the distinction is relevant to how one reads the conclusion of the ‘sec-
ond step’.
 4. See e.g. Pippin (2013:377, 381), who refers to Sellars (1967).
 5. A distinction should be made between, on the one hand, intui-
tions that are (or are not) subsumed under the categories and, on the 
other, intuitions that are (or are not) subsumable under the categories. 
For intuitions can, not only not de facto be subsumed under the cat-
egories, but also be incapable of being subsumed under the catego-
ries. Therefore, all subsumed intuitions are ipso facto subsumable, but 
not all intuitions are subsumable. This distinction is important for an 
understanding of the position of essentialist nonconceptualism and 
will be spelled out in the course of this chapter; moreover, the question 
of the subsumability of intuitions seems implied by the very starting 
point of TD. However, to differentiate between the effective applica-
tion and the applicability of the categories to intuition, as Grüne (2011) 
suggests, seems irrelevant, as the application of the categories is relevant 
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in cases of knowledge only (whereas it is not a matter of course that 
intuitions contribute to knowledge). The categories either apply, in the 
case of objectively valid representations, or they do not, in the case of 
subjectively valid representations or representations that fail to apply to 
empirical objects. The issue of applicability, then, concerns the question 
whether or not categories effectively apply to intuition in the various 
possible cases. The distinction between effective application and appli-
cability suggests that there is a possibility that categories are applicable 
to intuitions but are not effectively applied. This view, it seems to me, 
only leads to regress problems. For if categories are applicable to intui-
tions, but not yet effectively applied, then what makes it the case that 
they are so applied?
 6. (Strong) conceptualism is precisely the view that “we cannot be percep-
tually presented with a particular independently of the application of 
concepts” (Allais 2009:386).
 7. I.e. children have intuitions that occur independently of conceptual 
activity (see V-Anth/Collins, 25:10; V-Anth/Fried, 25:473).
 8. V-Lo/Wiener, 24:846; Log, 9:65; Anth, 7:196; DfS, 2:59ff.; cf. KU, 
5:464n.
 9. I want to abstract here from the standard distinction between ‘state 
nonconceptualism’ and ‘content nonconceptualism’. Content noncon-
ceptualism asserts that the content of intuitions and the content of 
concepts are different in kind, so that the intuitional content funda-
mentally exceeds our conceptual capacity, whereas state nonconceptu-
alism asserts that, although intuitions and conceptual assertions show 
the same content, a subject can be in a state in which she hasn’t got 
at her disposal concepts with which she can make assertions about the 
content of her intuitions. The distinction between content and state 
nonconceptualism seems irrelevant for the issue of the dependency of 
intuitions on the functions of thought or conceptual capacities, for 
the functions of thought or conceptual capacities concern the relation 
between intuitions and a priori concepts, which content nonconceptu-
alism by definition seems to foreclose. On the other hand, state non-
conceptualism seems to imply that, although a subject can be in a state 
in which she only has intuitions and hasn’t got at her disposal concepts 
with which to describe these intuitions, the mental content of those 
intuitions is always already conceptual. For this reason, one could argue 












sense (Hanna 2013a:5). Hanna believes that content nonconceptualism 
is the only legitimate form of nonconceptualism. In order however to 
avoid the aforementioned radical consequence of content nonconcep-
tualism, namely that it apparently forecloses the possibility of a relation 
between intuitions and concepts, one distinguishes between ‘absolute’ 
or ‘essentialist’ and ‘relative’ or ‘non-essentialist’, or ‘strong’ and ‘weak’ 
nonconceptualism. Relative (non-essentialist, weak) nonconceptual-
ism leaves open the possibility that despite the fundamental difference 
between intuitional content and conceptual content the content of 
intuitions is articulated in conceptual assertions (Allais 2009:386). See 
further Schulting (2015:564–565n.7, 569–570n.19).
 10. For more discussion of the debate that ensued after Allais (2009), see 
Allais (2016) and the new essays in Schulting (2016a).
 11. I provide a detailed analysis of Kant’s general notion of ‘synthesis’ in 
Schulting (2012b, Chaps. 6, 7). The role of synthesis in empirical intui-
tion in both the A- and B-Deduction will be discussed in Chaps. 6 and 7 
(this volume), respectively.
 12. For a detailed analysis of this passage, see Schulting (2012b:141ff.).
 13. For the origin of these terms, see Sellars (1997:76).
 14. Cf. Sellars (1997:33) about the ‘Myth of the Given’.
 15. Kemp Smith has “expression” for Ausübung, which unfortunately loses 
the active aspect meant here by Kant. This is relevant, since McDowell 
systematically wants to deflate any such activity on the level of sensibil-
ity. See further below.
 16. McDowell writes: “Visual experiences ‘make’ or ‘contain’ claims in that 
they are conceptual episodes, actualizations of conceptual capacities, 
and as such are to be understood on the model of linguistic perfor-
mances in which claims are literally made” (2009a:10).
 17. More recently, Cassam (2007) has argued something similar to what 
Sellars means. For Cassam, it likewise holds that an intuition is already 
conceptual but at the same time space must be made for what Dretske 
(1969) has labelled “simple seeings”, non-epistemic seeings or percepts 
which are not in itself conceptual and are tantamount to the sheer 
reception of sensory material without involvement of concepts; impor-
tantly, a simple seeing is not a perception. Cassam paraphrases Dretske’s 
account of the difference between “epistemic” and “non-epistemic” or 
“simple seeing”: “[S]imple seeing is concept-free, since it implies noth-
ing about the conceptual resources of the perceiver, and belief neutral 
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in the sense that simply seeing X is compatible with no beliefs about X. 
In both of these respects seeing X is like stepping on X; one can step on 
X without recognizing it as an X or having any beliefs about X. In con-
trast, perception is ‘(either by stipulation or common understanding) 
cognitively loaded’ since ‘some degree of recognition or categorization 
is essential to our perception of things’ […]. If this is right, then ‘it is 
by no means obvious that one must perceive something in order to see 
it’ […]. Not knowing what a cup is prevents one from perceiving a cup 
but not from seeing a cup” (2007:133).
 18. For a more detailed analysis of the Leitfaden, see Schulting (2012b, 
Chap. 5), and Longuenesse (2006).
 19. Cf. Kant’s use of the term Ausübung (B151), translated by Kemp Smith 
as “expression” and by Guyer/Wood, more appropriately and correctly, 
as “exercise”. In a later essay, ‘Avoiding the Myth of the Given’ (2009b), 
McDowell has less qualms about employing the term ‘exercise’ in this 
context.
 20. See again above note 17.
 21. But see Chap. 6 for a conceptualist reading of the A-Deduction.
 22. The Guyer/Wood translation has “an effect of the understanding 
on sensibility”; this reflects Kant’s standard meaning for the word 
Wirkung as one half of the cause-effect (Ursache-Wirkung) relation; the 
causal effect, of some sort, of the understanding on sensibility is thus 
meant here, that is, the effect of the causality of the spontaneity of the 
understanding, being a special kind of causality (see Schulting 2012b, 
Chap. 7; see also Chap. 3, this volume).
 23. In a later essay (2009b:264), McDowell is though willing to countenance 
that the unity of intuition is due to a power to judge, but he also holds 
that the activity responsible for the unity of the intuition is “unconscious”.
 24. Cf. the debate between Pippin and McDowell on the issue of ‘subjec-
tivism’ in Pippin (2005a, b) and McDowell (2009a:185–203), and 
Pippin (2007, 2015) for Pippin’s last reply. I am in general agreement 
with Pippin’s criticisms against McDowell on the issue of subjectivity. 
However, in a later text (2013:382–383), Pippin seems to diverge from 
the position delineated here, and to agree with McDowell, in that, 
according to Pippin, in demonstrative reference, that is, in intuitive 
 representings, which, as Sellars put it, are nonetheless non-generally 
conceptual, we do not explicitly judge that S is P, that is, apply sor-











problem for Kant: if the apperceptive act in a perceptual taking is not yet 
the act that produces an explicit judgement of the subject-predicate form 
(a ‘judgemental taking’), then one wonders which other act makes it the 
case that we apperceptively judge that S is P, rather than there just being 
merely an apperceptive (non-generally conceptual) perceptual taking 
there to be a book on the table, say. It seems as if Pippin suggests that 
non-generally conceptual takings (in perception) and attribution of sor-
tal concepts in explicit judgements are two separately occurring possible 
instances of apperceptive taking, which is in tension with his other right-
ful claim that we should not take Kant to argue that conceptual form 
is somehow imposed on prior given nonconceptual sensory material. 
If, as Pippin claims, sensible content is always already a non-generally 
conceptually informed, i.e. an apperceived content, then the problem 
of the putative gap between nonconceptual content and conceptual 
form appears to have now, in his latest reading, been transposed to an 
 ostensible gap between the instantiation of the apperceptive act in a per-
ceptual taking and its instantiation in an actual judgement. In my view, 
for Kant, the actualisation of conceptual form in sensibility, by means 
of an act of apperception, happens solely in judgement, for any given 
empirical judgement. Pippin (and Sellars) seem to want to model, along 
 quasi-Kantian lines, a kind of bottom-up analysis of how perceptual 
 takings are already conceptually shaped, however inchoately, before they 
are articulated in judgements. But this kind of phenomenological speci-
fication is, to my mind, not available within the Kantian transcendental 
framework. Kant’s analysis of conceptual form as a necessary transcenden-
tal condition of perception is based on the assumption of the givenness 
of experience, in the strong Kantian sense of experience as equivalent to 
knowledge claims (judgements) (B147), from which he then regresses to 
its conditions of possibility. Kant does not, in my view, argue for the con-
ditions of possibility of the gradual generation of experience, as perceptual 
takings that may or may not result in judgemental takings.
 25. See further Schulting (2012b:141ff.).
 26. See also note 24.
 27. We can see a similar problem with Longuenesse’s (1998) account of the 
twofold application of the categories: categories are said to govern syn-
theses of the sensible manifold, in a pre-discursive mode, and are only 
then effectively “reflected concepts” in discursive judgements. For dis-
cussion, see Schulting (2012b:33–38).
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 28. McDowell tries to justify this potential/actual approach to the rela-
tion between intuitions and discursive intellectual activity by referring 
to Kant’s own use of the modality in the formulation of apperception 
in the ‘I think’-proposition at B131 (i.e. the verbal phrase “must be 
able”) (see McDowell 2009a:265–266, 271). Presumably, this expresses 
the necessary possibility that all my representations are accompanied 
by an ‘I think’, but need not actually be so accompanied. But this is 
based on a (common) misreading of that verbal phrase. See my analy-
sis in Schulting (2012a, b). See also Chap. 4 (this volume), specifically, 
Sect. 4.8.
 29. See Pippin (2015:68–69) and note 24 above.
 30. Here, I rely on the more succinct 2008 paper. See also Hanna (2011a, 
b, 2013b).
 31. In the literature various types of nonconceptualism are distinguished, 
i.e. state and content nonconceptualism and weak and strong vari-
ants of nonconceptualism. Roughly speaking, a Kantian conceptu-
alist regards the relation between intuition and concept such that no 
intuition exists without involving, at least in principle, conceptuality 
(broadly conceived). A Kantian nonconceptualist, by contrast, is some-
one who regards that relation in such a way that there is no necessary 
entailment between any arbitrary existing intuition (appearances, sensi-
ble content) and conceptuality (broadly conceived). See the definitions 
given at the outset of this chapter, and especially note 9.
 32. See also Grüne (2009) on blind intuition. Grüne’s richly documented 
book also deals with the discussion of nonconceptual content, but her 
own reading is not classifiable as nonconceptualist strictly speaking. See 
further Chap. 6.
 33. Cf. the discussion between Cassam (2008) and Longuenesse (2008) on 
the issue of a priori synthesis and regress.
 34. Kant’s spontaneous ‘I’ of transcendental apperception is of course, in a 
certain cognitively indeterminable sense, grounded in an ontologically 
more fundamental, but unknowable, noumenal substance. But this 
does not detract from the originality and spontaneity of transcendental 
apperception relative to empirical experience. Transcendental appercep-
tion, or what Hanna calls “higher level spontaneity”, is at any rate not 
grounded in sensory content, however much synthesised by a putative 
“lower level” spontaneity. See again Chap. 3.












 36. I argue for the rigorous coextensivity between the analytic and syn-
thetic unities of apperception in Schulting (2012b). See also Chap. 2 
(this volume).
 37. See further Schulting (2012b, 2015) and Chaps. 6 and 7 (this volume).
 38. In the literature a distinction is made between absolute and relative 
nonconceptualism. Absolute nonconceptualism means that percep-
tion and belief are essentially or intrinsically different, while relative 
nonconceptualism indicates that a subject has mental content with-
out possessing the relevant concepts to describe that content (see Allais 
2009:386). See above note 9. The main difference between Hanna 
and Allais is that Hanna thinks Kant is an essential nonconceptualist, 
whereas Allais believes Kant is a relative nonconceptualist.
 39. At B47/A32, Kant writes: “That representation […] which can only be 
given through a single object, is an intuition.” Thus, intuition could be 
seen as what in current language is considered a singular reference to an 
object or particular.
 40. Usually, two criteria for intuitions are mentioned: (1) the singularity 
criterion (A320/B377; A19/B33; B47/A32), and (2) the immediacy 
criterion (V-Met/Schön, 28:484; A68/B93). But a third criterion can 
be singled out: the dependency criterion (V-Met/Schön, 28:484; B72; 
Prol, 4:281), for an intuition is dependent on a prior given object. For 
an account of the potential problems that arise for nonconceptualists 
who rely on a strong reading of this criterion, see Stephenson (2015).
 41. See by contrast McDowell (2009a:32, 100–101). McDowell reads Kant’s 
assertion at B159, i.e. the assertion that categories apply to “whatever 
objects may present themselves to our senses”, such that even the present-
ing, in and through intuition, of objects does not happen “indepen-
dently of its cooperation with the understanding”. In the original Dutch 
article on which this chapter is based (see Schulting 2010:704n.76), I 
misquoted McDowell as referring to the passage following, at B160, 
where Kant writes that “everything that may ever come before the senses 
must stand under the laws that arise a priori from the understanding 
alone”, but, as I pointed out in the aforementioned earlier version, this 
must clearly be read in the light of the sentence quoted by McDowell; 
the “everything” means merely “objects” presenting themselves, not lit-
erally every and all representations (see further Chap. 7). Aaron Griffith 
advances a stronger conceptualist reading of this passage, by contend-
ing “that even sense perception without judgement stands under the 
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categories” (2012:207). This is a standard reading but it makes no sense. 
How can sense perception which is not a judgement, and hence not an 
inseparable component of a judgement, still stand under functions of 
judgement that give it, the judgement, objective validity, i.e. the catego-
ries? A perception is either an inseparable component of an actual judge-
ment, thus implying application of the categories, or it is not, which 
means that it is merely an intuition of an object. There is nothing essen-
tial about perception as such, “without judgement”, that makes it amena-
ble to standing under the categories, which are after all nothing but the 
logical functions of judgement (B143).
 42. In his pre-Critical philosophy, around 1769, Kant still held the view 
that intuition provides “immediate cognition of individual things”, but 
he also then believed in “intuitive concepts” (Refl 3957, 17:364 [Kant 
2005:104]). After the Inaugural Dissertation (1770), it seems plausible 
that, since he gave up on the idea of ‘intuitive concepts’ and sought to 
explain how the intellect and sensible intuition work together to yield 
knowledge, he also relinquished the idea that intuition provides imme-
diate cognition of individual things, separably from the intellect.
 43. Cf. by contrast McDowell, who writes: “Kant urges that objects do not 
count as present to intuition unless what is given to the senses has cat-
egorial unity, […] categories secure for intuitions a genuinely objective 
purport […]” (2009a:100).
 44. Compare Griffith (2012), who claims to argue for a less strong con-
ceptualism (than Allais’s), by holding the view that indeed categories are 
required for intuition, but not that one need employ empirical concepts 
for having intuitions. Strong conceptualism in his view would mean 
that empirical concepts are needed for intuition. It seems though that 
strong conceptualism for Allais just means the thesis that categories 
as general rules are required for the existence of an intuition (she also 
seems to conflate the two questions that Griffith wants separated; see 
further below). Griffith’s weak conceptualism thus is still stronger than 
Allais’s relative nonconceptualism (i.e. the view that intuition can but 
need not stand under the categories), so counts as strong conceptualism 
within Allais’s perspective. Furthermore, I believe Griffith’s strategy is 
not pertinent to Kant’s analysis in TD, since that analysis only concerns 
the use of pure concepts and not empirical concepts, and therefore the 
controversial claim regarding the absolute distinction of intuition and 
concept—the claim that is central to the debate on Kant and noncon-











concepts or the categories for the possibility of intuition. The question 
regarding the application of empirical concepts is of secondary rele-
vance, as their application requires at any rate the application of the cat-
egories, given that for Kant concepts are only employed in judgements 
and categories are nothing but the functions of judgement.
 45. One could of course concentrate on the A-account of synthesis, as 
Allais indeed does (2009:396–397n.37) (see further below), and con-
tend that only the synthesis of recognition involves concepts, not yet 
the synthesis of apprehension and the synthesis of the imagination. For 
a critique of such a reading of Kant’s account in the A-Deduction, see 
Chap. 6.
 46. See further Schulting (2012b:88–89, 247).
 47. Cf. Allison (2012:35–36).
 48. See also B154, where Kant identifies “the transcendental action of the 
imagination” with the “synthetic influence of the understanding on the 
inner sense” (emphasis added).
 49. For a detailed analysis of what kind of combination is at issue in this 
important passage at the outset of the B-Deduction, see Schulting 
(2012b:141ff.). There, I argue that not all kinds of combination or 
connection of the manifold in an intuition are due to an act of the 
understanding. The kind of combination that is at issue at B129–30 is 
a priori, necessary synthesis.
 50. This is not a novel thesis. See also Hoppe (1983) and my own account 
in Schulting (2012b:141ff.).
 51. Allais is more careful in her formulations than I suggest here. See again 
the discussion in the preceding section. At any rate, it seems to me that 
Allais believes that intuition in and of itself refers to an already given 
object, and in this sense provides the objective validity that concepts 
(categories) require to have true application. For Allais, objective valid-
ity does not lie solely in the function of judgement, as on my view.
 52. Compared to her earlier account in Allais (2009), in her book (Allais 
2015) Allais is more precise in saying that intuition per se is not by def-
inition characterised by synthesis, but she still believes that some form 
of a priori synthesis (i.e. productive imagination) does not require the 
categories. This contrasts with my view that all a priori syntheses are 
part of judgement, and only take place within it.
 53. For a good analysis of the potential problems that face Allais’s reading 
on this latter point, see Newton (2016). See also Chap. 4 (this volume), 
in particular Sect. 4.9.
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 54. Other passages in TD that support nonconceptualism regarding intui-
tion are B145 (“[T]he manifold for intuition must already be given 
prior to the synthesis of understanding and independently from it”) 
and B132 (“That representation that can be given prior to all thinking 
is called intuition”).
 55. Also Allison (2001:38) thinks along those lines. Allison speaks of the 
“exorciz[ing]” of the “specter” of “transcendental chaos”, which at 
B122–3 Kant supposedly holds before us as a threatening possibility; 
according to Allison, this exorcism is the central goal of TD. See also 
Allison (1996:49–50), where Allison refers to “the Kantian analogue of 
the Cartesian ‘evil genius’, a spectre that must be exorcized if the pro-
ject of the Deduction is to succeed”. Cf. Allison (2012:48, 2015:54).
 56. Likewise, Grüne (2011:475) thinks the hypothesis in B122–3 has 
“only a didactic function”. Cf. Bowman (2011:423) and Anderson 
(2015:352n.28). Anderson reasons that B122 should be taken “to be a 
description not of how things are, but of how they appear to be—they 
frame the difficulty that the argument of the Deduction is meant to over-
come, and therefore indicate the very opposite of Kant’s settled view”. 
This view is hard to reconcile with the indicative mood of B122.
 57. At A111–12, however, Kant indeed appears to argue that “all possible 
appearances”, even “the entire sensibility”, are “necessarily in agreement 
with the conditions of the thoroughgoing unity of self-consciousness, 
i.e., must stand under universal functions of synthesis […]”, which 
would endorse Ginsborg’s reading. But compare the passage prior to 
this one, at A110: “[…] all appearances, insofar as objects are to be given 
to us through them, must stand under a priori rules of their synthetic 
unity […]” (emphasis added), which points to a limiting condition on 
the relation between appearances and categories as “a priori rules of 
their synthetic unity”.
 58. See note 57 above.
 59. Cf. the early Reflexion that is contemporaneous with Kant’s letter 
to Herz from 1772, Refl 4636, 17:619–620: “(One can intuit some-
thing without thinking something thereby or thereunder.) All cognitions 
come to us through thinking, i.e., through concepts” (Kant 2005:151; 
emphasis added).
 60. Cf. Refl 5221, 18:122.25–123.02.
 61. For further discussion see Schulting (2015:571–572).













 63. At A108–9, Kant differentiates ‘appearance’ and ‘intuition’ thus: 
“Appearances are the only objects that can be given to us immediately, 
and that in them which is immediately related to the object is called 
intuition.”
 64. See A120, which makes it clear that appearances are the data given in 
inner sense, before any synthesis is carried out.
 65. That the projects of the Aesthetic and TD are naturally not completely 
separable is also suggested by Kant’s words, in a passage prior to the 
above-quoted, that hint at the necessity of a transcendental deduc-
tion not just of the concepts of the understanding but also of space as a 
result of the ambiguity in the concept of the latter (see B120/A88).
 66. See Onof and Schulting (2015).
 67. Indeed, Onof and Schulting (2015) show that the sui generis unity of 
space, i.e. what can be called the unicity of space, is irreducible to con-
ceptual unity. See further Chap. 7.
 68. Hanna (2011b) believes that if Kantian nonconceptualism is true, 
then Kantian conceptualism is false, and consequently TD, which is 
centrally based on a conceptualist claim, is a failure. But Hanna’s dis-
junctive reading is based on a failure to see the conditional structure of 
Kant’s argument for the necessary conceptualisation of intuitions, and 
thus a failure to respect the radically subjectivist nature of Kant’s con-
ceptualism.
 69. However, some conceptualists believe that there is no gap in the first 
place, hence their position that the possibility that Kant entertains at 
B122 is merely hypothetical.
 70. See also the more detailed discussion of this passage in Schulting 
(2016b).
 71. Cf. Refl 5221, 18:123.
 72. See my detailed account of the regressive nature of TD in Schulting 
(2012b:61–75).
 73. Hanna (2013b) has acknowledged this threat of a regress, if we read 
Kant’s distinction, as he does, between figurative and intellectual syn-
thesis as shared out between nonconceptual and conceptual content. 
(He aptly calls it the “the schmimagination vicious regress problem”). 
But it is unclear how he thinks it can be solved. See further Schulting 
(2015).
 74. On the argument of MD (the Leitfaden section), see further Schulting 
(2012b, Chap. 5).
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